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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief following convictions of two 
counts of first degree murder. The denial should be reversed because Sarah Johnson did not 
receive the constitutionally required effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to 
present readily available expert testimony regarding fingerprints and because newly discovered 
evidence identifYing Christopher Hill as the person who last handled the rifle, scope, and 
ammunition used in the murders requires post-conviction relief. 
B. Procedural History 
Appellant Sarah Johnson, at age 16, was accused of murdering her parents. She was 
represented by Robert Pangburn (no longer a licensed attorney) and Mark Rader (an attorney 
from Vale, Oregon) and convicted following a jury trial. Sarah was sentenced to two fixed life 
terms with a fifteen year firearm enhancement. R Vol. 1, pp. 14-16, Petitioner's PC Ex. 15, State 
v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 972,188 P.3d 912, 914 (2008).1 
Mr. Pangburn and Mr. Rader failed to file a timely notice of appeal despite Sarah's 
specific request that they do so. R Vol. 1, pp. 32-33. Consequently, the Supreme Court 
dismissed the appeal. R Vol. 1, pp. 207-08. 
Thereafter, Sarah filed a petition for post-conviction relief raising claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel and denial of due process. R Vol. 1, pp. 14-27. The District Court found 
1 In this Brief, the post-conviction clerk's record is referred to as "R;" the post-conviction 
transcript is referred to as "EH Tr.;" the post-conviction exhibits are referred to as "PC Ex.;" the 
trial clerk's record is referred to as "T R;" the trial transcript is referred to as "T T r.;" and the trial 
exhibits are referred to as "T Ex." 
ineffective assistance in the failure to file a timely notice of appeal and re-entered the judgment 
of conviction allowing time for the direct appeal to begin anew. Sarah immediately filed a timely 
notice of appeal and the District Court stayed proceedings on the remaining post-conviction 
claims. R Vol. 1, pp. 212-218. 
Sarah raised four issues on appeal: 1) whether the jury instruction on aiding and abetting 
constructively amended the charging document; 2) whether this constituted a fatal variance; 3) 
whether her constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict was denied when the jury was not 
instructed that it must unanimously agree as to whether she actually killed her parents or whether 
she acted as an aider and abettor; and, 4) whether error occurred when the District Court failed to 
remove a juror from the jury pool or obtain an unequivocal assurance from him that he would 
follow all court instructions. Relief was denied. State v. Johnson, supra. 
Post-conviction proceedings resumed, new counsel was appointed to represent Sarah, and 
an amended petition was filed. R Vol. 1, p. 229, R Vol. 2, pp. 367-39l. 
Thereafter, the District Court reassigned the case from Judge Barry Wood who had 
presided at trial to Judge Richard Bevan. R Vol. 3, p. 714. 
With the permission of the court, a second amended petition was filed. This petition re-
alleged every averment in the original petition. Five claims were raised: 1) Sarah is innocent; 2) 
the District Court lacked jurisdiction; 3) Sarah's right to due process was violated; 4) Sarah's 
right to effective assistance at trial and on appeal was violated; and 5) newly discovered evidence 
requires relief. R Vol. 3, pp. 801-827. 
Because Judge Bevan had not presided at the trial, he initially indicated his intent to read 
the transcripts and record of the prior proceedings in the case and the record was entered into 
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evidence in the post-conviction proceeding. However, the Judge ultimately determined not to 
read the entire record and instructed counsel for Sarah and the State to direct the court to the 
portions of the record which supported the various claims. R Vol. 7, pp. 1716-172l. 
Some of the claims in the second amended petition were ultimately conceded by Sarah to 
be without merit, some were denied in summary judgment, and some proceeded to an evidentiary 
hearing and then were denied. R Vol. 7, pp. 1835-1928. Two claims are relevant to this appeal: 
1) Ineffective assistance in dealing with fingerprint issues. R Vol. 3, pp. 815-817. 
Specifically, counsel was ineffective in failing to elicit from the defense expert his opinion that 
latent prints found on the tools of the murders were fresh prints. R Vol. 6, pp. 1445-6. That 
claim was denied following the evidentiary hearing. R Vol. 7, pp. 1916-17. 
2) Newly discovered evidence that Christopher Hill's fingerprints were on the rifle, the 
rifle scope, and an insert from the ammunition box required a new trial. R Vol. 3, pp. 822-825. 
The District Court denied this claim following an evidentiary hearing. R Vol. 6, pp. 1919-27. 
The court found that the evidence met the first and fourth prongs of the Drapeau test for newly 
discovered evidence. State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691, 551 P.2d 972,978 (1976). R Vol. 6, 
p. 1920. However, the court further found that neither the second nor the third prongs were met 
insofar as the evidence was not material and would not likely produce an acquittal. ld. 
C. Statement of Facts From Trial 
At 6:20 a.m. on September 2, 2003, Sarah ran from her home in Bellevue, Idaho, 
hysterical and screaming for help because someone had shot her parents, Diane and Alan 
Johnson. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1517, In. 16 - p. 1519, In. 5. 
On October 29, 2003, Sarah - a high school sophomore, on the school volleyball team, a 
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babysitter "without a mean side," a "loving, caring, and beautiful" girl with no history of 
violence, legal problems or even school disciplinary issues - was arrested and charged with her 
parents'murders. T Tr. Vol. 7, p. 5183, In. 24 - p. 5184, In. 1; Vol. 8, p. 5739, In. 2-3; p. 5756, 
In. 8-9; Vol. 9, p. 6362, In. 15-20; T Ex. PSI pp. 16,28. She was held in adult facilities, with 
adult female cell mates, often within sight of and in contact with adult male inmates, for two 
years, in clear violation ofIdaho law. I.C. § 20-602. T Tr. Vol. 1, p. 428, In. 22 - p. 431, In. 10, 
p. 445, In. 9-20. In 2008, she was finally tried. She was convicted and sentenced to two terms of 
fixed life with an enhancement for use of a firearm. 2 
The State said its case was "tantamount - this may not be a correct analogy - but with the 
U.S. troops getting ready to go into Baghdad ... " T Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1210, In. 5-7. In contrast, one 
of the trial witnesses told Sarah's lead counsel that he was ajoke; he introduced his closing by 
stating that his argument would be "like a Quentin Tarantino movie, kind of pieces here and 
there, all over the place." He ended up surrendering his license to practice in Oregon during 
Sarah's case and his license to practice in Idaho shortly thereafter, following the initiation of 
disciplinary proceedings in both states. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 3994, In. 22-24; Supp. T Tr. p. 223, In. 
10-13; PC Tr. p. 372, In. 1 - p. 377, In 19. 
2 This case attracted a lot of media interest and was on Court TV. The judge noted that he 
was following the nightly news about the case. T Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1319, In. 14-15. He joked with 
and teased the Court TV crew. T Tr. Vol. 7, p. 4955, In. 8-19; Vol. 8, p. 5404, In. 9-15; p. 5478, 
In. 10-11. The jury was told they could be filmed for TV when returning a verdict, but should not 
let that distract them. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1456, In. 15 - p. 1457, In. 3. (Upon giving the verdict, the 
jury asked the judge to preclude this. T Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6172, In. 8-12.) The TV crew made facial 
expressions in response to the evidence and alerted counsel that Sarah's family was wearing 
buttons bearing photos of Diane and Alan. T Tr. Vol. 8, pg. 5550, In. 4 - p. 5551, In. 11; Supp. 
Tr. p. 541, In. 11-14. And, Sarah's attorney who was a repeat guest on "Nancy Grace," tried to 
get Sarah on "Nightline," and prepared for court by watching himself on Court TV. PC Tr. p. 
405, In. 24 - p. 406, In. 1; p. 409, In. 20 - p. 410, In. 10. 
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The lohnsons were killed by two shots from a .264 magnum rifle. The rifle and 
ammunition had been hidden for over a year in the closet of their guesthouse by their friend and 
renter Mel Speegle.3 T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2418, In. 5-7. The shot that killed Diane was a contact or 
near contact shot fired as she slept in her bed. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2309, In. 23 - p. 2312, In. 9. The 
shot that killed Alan was a shot to the chest fired as he came out of the shower in the master 
bathroom. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 2071, In. 24 - p. 2072, In. 5; Vol. 4, p. 2300, In. 18-22. It was not 
immediately incapacitating and Alan appeared to have walked and moved about for seconds to 
minutes after. T Tr. Vol. 8, p. 5358, In. 11-25. He was found on the floor next to Diane's side of 
the bed with his head near the wall between the bed and the nightstand. State's TEx. 309. The 
rifle was left on the floor in the doorway between the master bedroom and bathroom. T Tr. Vol. 
3, p. 1849, In. 8-11; p. 1955, In. 18-21. 
When Sarah fled the house, she ran to a neighbor's. She knocked and did not get a quick 
answer. She tried a second house. Finally, she got a response at the Richards' house. 911 was 
called and a group of neighbors went into the Johnson house to offer help. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1518, 
In. 8 - p. 1523, In. 3; p. 1589, In. 7 - p. 1593, In. 2; p. 1630, In. 10 - p. 1631, In. 3. 
According to expert testimony, the shot to Diane's head resulted in a spherical explosion 
of tissue, bone, blood, and cerebral-spinal fluid that landed on everything, including the shooter, 
3 There were many other guns on the property as Alan and Diane were trap shooters and 
hunters. They had three gun safes, including one in Sarah's bedroom and one in the guesthouse 
reloading room. And, Mr. Speegle had three other guns hidden in the same closet as the .264 
rifle. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1566, In. 16-25; p. 2061, In. 17-24; p. 2137, In. 24 - p. 2138, In. 13; p. 2702, 
In. 11-16; Vol. 5, p. 3362, In. 3; Vol. 7, p. 4558, In. 1-2. 
Although Sarah knew gun safety and how to shoot some weapons, her brother, Matthew, 
who had instructed her in firearms, testified that to his knowledge, she did not know how to load 
a bolt action rifle. T Tr. Vol. 8, p. 5804, In. 11 - p. 5803, In. 20. 
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within a slightly greater than four-foot radius. T Tr. Vol. 7, p. 4728, In. 3 - p. 4729, In. 10; Vol. 
8, p. 5363, In. 19-21; p. 5365, In. 1-7; p. 5652, In. 21 - p. 5633 In. 5. Pieces of bone and other 
tissue were thrown 25 feet or more. T Tr. Vol. 8, p. 5361, In. 22 - p. 5362, In. 5. 
Those entering the house saw blood and gore throughout the Johnsons' bed and 
bathroom, into the hall, and across the hall into Sarah's room. Blood, skin and hair were on the 
ceiling, walls, and floor and a sour musty odor filled the air. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1498, In. 3 - p. 
1600, In. 18. "It was just covered with blood and flesh and brain material running up to the 
ceiling, across the ceiling of the bedroom, going towards the bathroom ... " T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 
1658, In. 11-17. "It was covered, ... with everything on the wall. Things were dripping off the 
wall and off the ceiling on the floor." T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1659, In. 7-10. "There was carnage. There 
was a large amount of - there was carnage." T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1870, In. 17-18. 
Kitchen knives were found on the bed in the guest bedroom, at the foot of the Johnsons' 
bed, and on the carpet. A leather glove from a pair usually kept in Diane's SUV, Sarah's keys 
including a key to the guesthouse, the magazine of a nine-millimeter handgun wrapped in a 
bandana, and two .264 caliber magnum shells were in Sarah's bedroom. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1662, 
In. 2-6; p. 1788, In. 8-10; p. 2036, In. 19 - p. 2040, In. 10. In the photos the State took of the 
shells in Sarah's room, they are inexplicably in a variety of positions on her dresser. TEx. 1003, 
1005, 1006. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2271, In. 9 - p. 2272, In. 6. 
Outside, a pink robe with .25 automatic pistol ammunition in the pocket, a latex glove, 
and a leather glove were in a garbage can. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1826, In. 19-20; p. 1829, In. 3-15; p. 
1831, In. 19-20; p. 1900, In. 21-22. The robe had been Sarah's and was covered with blood 
spatter and tissue. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3115, In. 8-17. The police did not test the lid of the garbage 
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can for fingerprints. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 2055, In. 18 - p. 2056, In.1. 
In the guesthouse above the detached garage, the rifle scope lay on the bed. And, guns, a 
gun case, and ammunition remained in the closet. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1842, In. 16-18; p. 2125, In. 1 
- p. 2126, In. 16. TEx. 22. 
The door to the attached garage was unlocked, the lights were on, another rifle was on top 
of a chest freezer, and a rifle round casing which appeared to be from a bullet used in the killings 
was in plain sight. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1728, In. 22 - p.l731, In. 17; p. 1840, In. 17-24; p. 2079, In. 
1 ° -p. 2080, In. 18. 
A yellow labrador sat silent in her outdoor kennel even as several police officers walked 
by. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1734, In. 17 - p. 1735, In. 2. 
Officer Raul Ornelas, who was on the scene almost immediately, testified that he saw two 
or three sets of footprints in the grass going between the guesthouse and the house. And, an area 
where someone could hide behind a bush and look into the 10hnsons' bedroom looked as if 
people had been standing there. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1736, In. 9 - p. 1737, In. 2, p. 1767, In. 19-25. 
PC Ex. 4. 
No evidence was presented that whoever killed the 10hnsons had done anything 
amateurish like firing even a single extra shot, vomiting, or losing urinary or bowel control. See 
T.Tr. 
At the Richards' house, none of the neighbors, friends, family, medical responders, or 
police saw any blood on Sarah except for the bottoms of her socks, as was to be expected as she 
had to run over bloody carpet to get out of her house. That day, Sarah was observed by at least 
eight witnesses, including at least two medical people who examined her for injury and blood 
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and at least four officers and detectives that looked specifically for evidence relating to the 
crimes. Yet, no one saw any blood on her.4 T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1551, In. 7-9; p. 1577, In. 14-17; p. 
1612, In. 5-7; p. 1772, In. 4-5; p. 1818, In. 22-24; Vol. 4, p. 2175, In. 9-10; p. 2282, In. 8-12; Vol. 
8, p. 5560, In. 9-2l. 
In addition, no evidence indicated that anyone had washed up inside the Johnson house. 
TTr.Vol.3,p.1910,ln.8-p.1911,ln.2. 
Police quickly seized Sarah's pajama pants, t-shirt, and socks. The clothing was carefully 
analyzed and while blood was found on the bottom of her socks, no blood, blood spatter, or 
tissue was found anywhere else on any of her clothes. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1755, In. 1-19; Vol. 5, p. 
3189, In. 3-5. 
The police also promptly took Sarah to St. Luke's where they swabbed her head and 
hands, inside her ears, and all exposed areas looking for blood or tissue. They took photos, 
trimmed and saved her nails, ran filter paper through her hair, and plucked her pubic hair. 
Although Sarah is right handed, they found three bruises on the top of her left shoulder.5 They 
found no blood. Sarah was returned to the Richards' house, where an ISP evidence trailer was 
4 Rachel Richards testified that at some point that day, her mother asked Sarah if she had 
to go to the bathroom. When Sarah said that she did, Rachel went into the bathroom with her. 
Rachel watched Sarah and when Sarah was finished, she "splashed water on her face twice and 
then washed her hands." Sarah did not initiate this trip to the bathroom of her own accord and 
Rachel specifically denied that Sarah had scrubbed her face. No evidence was presented that the 
sink or towels she used got blood on them. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1565, In. 22 - p. 1566, In. 1; p. 1578, 
In. 7. 
5 These bruises appear to be a series of red striations on the top of Sarah's left shoulder. 
State's TEx. 153 and 238. Common sense would indicate that bruises from shooting a rifle in a 
right handed person would be on the right side of the body at or below the collar bone, not on the 
very top of the left shoulder. 
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brought and she was again swabbed and inspected and her hair again tested. Again, there was no 
blood or tissue found. TTr.Vol.3,p.1818,ln.15-p.1819,ln.16;p.1858,ln.l0-13;Vol.4,p. 
2249, In. 6-9; p. 2280, In. 11 - p. 2282, In. 8; p. 2472, In. 19-23; Vol. 6, p. 3653, In. 1-11; Vol. 7, 
p. 5032, In. 19-24; Vol. 8, p. 5754, In. 13. 
The question was how Sarah could have shot her parents when, according to the State's 
experts, blood and tissue exploded from her mother's head in a four-foot diameter sphere - a 
sphere which clearly covered the bathrobe worn by the shooter - yet have no blood, spinal fluid, 
or tissue anywhere on her except on the bottoms of her socks. See T Vol. 8, p. 5976, In. 15-21, 
where the State's expert testified that "any surface [above the bed] in the same plane as that robe, 
may be in the dispersion area of those [blood and tissue] droplets." 
The State's theory was that a sheet and comforter (a comforter not retained or tested) may 
have been over Diane's head when she was killed thus protecting Sarah's body from blood and 
tissue. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1986, In. 23 - p. 1987, In. 6; Vol. 4, p. 2313, In. 6 - p. 2314, In. 22. 
(There was a dispute as to whether the sheet actually had a bullet hole in it. T Tr. Vol. 8, p. 
5365, In. 16 - p. 5366, In. 8; p. 5659, In. 4-14. And, Officer Kirtley testified that he did not see a 
bullet hole or blood on the front of the comforter indicating that the comforter may have been 
folded back at the time of the shooting. T Tr. Vol. 8, p. 5225, In. 13 - p. 5226, In. 4.) The 
State's expert did not explain how the sheet and comforter could have allowed blood and tissue 
to get onto the robe, the ceiling, the bedroom walls, and into the hallway and Sarah's bedroom, 
but not onto any of Sarah's clothes which would have extended beneath the robe's hem or onto 
her face, hair, or hands. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 4212, In. 9-17. 
The State argued in closing that Sarah might have worn a shower cap and flushed it down 
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the toilet to explain the lack of blood in her hair. The flushed toilet theory was needed because 
the police specifically searched for a shower cap and could not find one. T Tr. Vol. 8, p. 5871, 
In. 11 - p. 5872, In. 10; Supp. Tr. p. 324, In. 23 - p. 325, In. 2. However, there was no evidence 
of a clogged toilet. And, the State offered no explanation for how the shower cap would have 
protected Sarah's legs beneath the hem of the robe and her neck and face above the collar of the 
robe, nor how Sarah could have removed a bloody shower cap and flushed it down the toilet 
without getting blood or tissue on her hands or elsewhere. See T Tr. 
The State bolstered its case by offering a motive. Sarah had been dating and had been the 
victim of at least seven statutory rapes by Bruno Santos.6 The Friday before her parents were 
killed, Sarah spent the night with Bruno without permission. She was caught and grounded and 
Alan threatened Bruno with violence and jail. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 2098, In. 22 - p. 2099, In. 7; Vol. 
4, p. 2762, In. 1-21. 
The State's witnesses testified that after being grounded, Sarah repeatedly stated that she 
loved her parents and understood that they were acting in her best interests. She believed that her 
parents and Bruno were going to go to one of her volleyball games together and she was hopeful 
they would be more receptive to him. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1540, In. 14-24; p. 1565, In. 1-13.7 
6 Bruno, a 19-year-old illegal alien, may have also raped another girl. That girl's parents 
moved her out of the area to avoid her having to testify at Sarah's trial. PC Tr. p. 185, In. 13 - p. 
186, In. 12. Bruno used and likely trafficked drugs and had been suspended from school for gang 
violence. He was deported to Mexico by the federal government, brought back to the United 
States at the behest of the State, and then ultimately deported again, because he was arrested for 
more drug offenses and the State could no longer safely monitor him. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2191, In. 4 
- p. 2210, In. 18; p. 2444, In.7-15; p. 2455, In. 2-15; p. 2474, In. 12 - p. 2482, In. 11. Bruno is 
currently in prison. See rDOC inmate locator www.accessidaho.org. 
7 The State presented evidence that Sarah had a habit of embellishing and self-
aggrandizing. T Tr. Vol. p. 1567, In. 11-16; Vol. 5, p. 3388, In. 15-20. For example, she told 
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However, the Richard's daughter, 18 year-old Rachel, testified that this was not a normal 
response, because most teenagers, including Sarah, would not forgive parents who grounded 
them. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1554, In. 9; p. 1570, In. 1-5. 
The State offered extensive evidence that Sarah's relationship with her mother was 
difficult, in part because Diane disapproved of Bruno. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2507, In. 20 - p. 2508, In. 
6. One friend testified that Diane was upset because Bruno was older, Mexican, and "slick." T 
Tr. Vol. 6, p. 3620, In. 6-15. Another testified that Alan said that Sarah was such a bad daughter 
to Diane that he believed Diane would have been justified in never doing anything kind for Sarah 
again. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2450, In. 1-7. On the other hand, this same friend testified that just a 
week before she was killed, Diane said that Sarah was a lovely daughter. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2537, 
In. 9-16. 
The evidence regarding Sarah's relationship with Alan was that they loved each other 
deeply and were extremely close. Alan was so upset about Sarah having intercourse with Bruno 
that he repeatedly cried in front of others and threatened to beat Bruno. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2441, In. 
4-6; Vol. 6, p. 3524, In. 22-25; p. 3535, In. 9-15; p. 3544, In. 4-9; p. 3547, In. 3-4; Vol. 7, p. 
people that she was engaged to marry Bruno, that he had proposed on bended knee, that she 
owned a Viper car, that her family was richer than they were, and that her father owned his 
business when in fact he was an employee. Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3291, In. 14 - p. 3293, In. 7; Vol. 6, p. 
3553, In. 4-10. Dr. Craig Beaver testified that embellishment and self-aggrandization were 
consistent with Sarah's situation. Prior to her parents' deaths, she had struggled with depression, 
lacked a good self-concept, and was taking Zoloft. Embellishment and self-aggrandization were 
Sarah's means of gaining attention and support. Tr. Vol. 7, p. 4631, In. 2-14. 
The evidence indicated that other family members may have shared traits of 
embellishment and self-aggrandizement. Sarah's brother Matt testified that he had built the 
guesthouse by himself at age 16, but then clarified that he was helped by a professional builder. 
He also cast himself as the family advisor and counselor on how to raise Sarah. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 
4525, In. 22 - p. 4527, In. 10; p. 4533, In. 17 - p. 4534, In. 11. 
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5194, In. 25 - p. 5195, In. 6. 
The State's theory was that Sarah was so selfish, so obsessed with Bruno, and so enraged 
by being grounded that, even though she had never before committed any act of serious or gun 
violence against anyone, she stayed up all night plotting her parents' murder. She took the rifle 
from its hiding place in the guesthouse, wore some combination of the three gloves without 
getting her fingerprints or any blood on any of them, took the scope off the rifle without harming 
fingerprints placed there previously by the last person to shoot the rifle, put on the robe and a 
shower cap, and shot her sleeping mother from a left handed position. She was not upset or 
deterred by the horrible result of the explosion of tissue and blood and next shot her father in the 
chest while he tried to reach out to her, all while she avoided getting any blood or tissue on her 
pajama pants, gloves, hands, face, or hair. She flushed the shower cap down the toilet, again 
without getting any blood on herself or causing any plumbing problems, and placed the knives on 
the beds without getting her fingerprints or DNA on them. She then ran out of the house and put 
the robe and two gloves in the garbage, again without getting blood from the robe on her hands. 
Then, in a pretend hysteria, she sought "help" from the neighbors, all the while forgetting or not 
caring that she had left cartridges, her keys including a key to the guesthouse, one of the gloves, 
and a pistol magazine in her bedroom, pistol ammunition in the robe, and a cartridge shell and 
another gun in the garage, and forgetting whether she wanted to tell the police that the door to her 
bedroom was open or closed at the time of the shootings. T Supp. Tr. p. 175, In. II-p. 218, In. 
10; p. 313, In. 13 - p. 344, In. II. 
To bolster this theory, the State presented testimony that Sarah's hair, held back in a 
ponytail, was too neat to have been slept on. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1522, In. 25 - p. 1523, In. 2. The 
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State offered no testimony speculating that Sarah's hair was mussed enough to be evidence of 
having worn a shower cap. 
The State also presented testimony that Sarah did not act the way someone ought to act 
upon the sudden violent death of both parents. Sarah wanted to see Bruno and her friends on the 
day of the murders. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1535, In. 18-21. When she saw Bruno, as he was being taken 
into St. Luke's pursuant to a detention warrant, she hugged him and said that she loved him and 
was sorry. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2283, In. 20-21. She sat on a fence looking angry, but not crying while 
waiting for her parents' bodies to be brought from the house, and then said that she needed to get 
out of there. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2575, In. 11 - p. 2576, In. 25; Vol. 6, p. 3650, In. 22-25. She 
wanted to go to volleyball practices and games. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1541, In. 5 - p. 1542, In. 6. She 
wanted to have her nails done and told the nail technician that she wanted to get on with her life. 
T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3347, In. 10 - p. 3348, In. 8. She could not remember details. She spoke of her 
parents as if they were still alive. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 3851, In. 9-10. When she went to her parents' 
memorial service she was concerned with her appearance and impressed with the number of 
people present. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3348, In. 9-14. (Her aunt, Linda Vavold, was also counting the 
number of people present and impressed by it, specifically noting at Sarah's sentencing hearing 
that 600 attended. T Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6255, In. 5-9.) 
On the morning of the murders, within minutes of Sarah arriving in hysterics at the 
Richards' house, the police arrived. Throughout that day and the days to follow, Sarah was 
questioned numerous times. These included two 20 minute interviews with Detective Harkins on 
the day her parents were killed, first at 8:30 a.m. and then at 11 :30 a.m. Detective Harkins 
described the second interview as accusatory and said that he read Miranda warnings but he had 
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to initial the form as Sarah was too upset to sign. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 2106, In. 1; Vol. 4, p. 2177, In. 
1- p. 2179, In. 5. The next day, Sarah was questioned at the sheriff's office and her statements 
that she had an attorney went unheeded. T Tr. p. 2425, In.23-p. 2444, In. 14, p.2488, In. 2-14. 
She was again questioned on September 12 and 13 at the sheriff's office. T Tr. p. 2446, In. 23 -
p. 2452, In. l. On the 13th , the sheriff directly accused her of murdering her parents but she 
maintained her innocence. T Tr. p. 2446, In. 8 - p. 2454, In. 19 . 
At least two of the interviews on the day of her parents' deaths were conducted after 
Sarah had been given Ambien, a hypnotic which makes people suggestible, to calm her down. T 
Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1544, In. 3-12; Vol. 4, p. 2176, In. 10-15. Officer Tremble, who questioned Sarah 
after she had been given the Ambien, described her as "disoriented." T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1870, In. 8-
14. Others did not share this observation. See T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2176, In. 5-22. 
Throughout the questioning, Sarah remained consistent that she had been in bed, heard 
two shots, ran to her parents' bedroom door, called out, did not hear a response, fled the house, 
and heard the sliding screen door to the bedroom open and shut as she ran. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1749, 
In. 1 - p. 1750, In. 1; p. 2099, In. 23 - p. 2102, In. 23; Vol. 4, p. 2430, In. 11-13. 
Her statements both volunteered and in response to police questioning were not consistent 
in some details. Sometimes she said she was asleep when she heard the first shot; sometimes she 
said that she had been awakened by the shower before she heard the shot. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1749, 
In. 1-2. Sometimes she said that she got out of bed upon hearing the first shot; sometimes she 
said that she stayed in bed until after hearing the second shot. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1749, In. 12-17; p. 
2101, In. 5; Vol. 4, p. 2430, In. 1-4. Sometimes she said that her bedroom door was open; 
sometimes she said that it was closed; and still other times she said that it was partly open. T Tr. 
14 
Vol. 3, p. 2100, In. 22-24; Vol. 4, p. 2428, In. 12-13; p. 2492, In. 13 - p. 2492, In. 9. Sometimes 
she said that her parents' bedroom door was closed; sometimes she said that it was open. T Tr. 
Vol. 3., p. 1812, In. 11-12; Vol. 4, p. 2430, In. 15-19. (According to the State's expert, both 
bedroom doors had to be open. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 4143, In. 17-23.) 
When Sarah was taken to St. Luke's, her godmother, Lorna Kolash contacted an attorney. 
He met Sarah at the hospital and she retained him; he notified the sheriff, the marshal, and the 
prosecutor that he was representing Sarah and that she was invoking her rights to counsel and to 
remain silent. He gave Sarah his card and told her to present it should anyone try to question her. 
However, Sarah was taken from the hospital for further evidentiary testing without her attorney's 
consent, presence, or knowledge. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1944, In. 6-15; Vol. 8, p. 5557, In. 6 - p. 5564, 
In. 12; p. 5572, In. 20 - p. 5590, In. 16. 
And, the next day, her guardians, Jim and Linda Vavold, took her into the sheriff's office 
for more questioning. Sarah's statement that she had an attorney and he had told her not to talk 
to the police was ignored. Ms. Vavold testified that she and her husband did not know that Sarah 
had counsel and that they were not inclined to obtain counsel on her behalf because if she did not 
kill her parents she did not need representation. This conflicted with Ms. Vavold's journal entry 
for this time wherein she documented the name of the attorney representing Sarah. Ms. Vavold 
testified that at the sheriff's office she and her husband convinced Sarah that she did not need 
counsel. T Tr. Vol. 1, p. 654, In. 9 - p. 655, In. 21; Vol 4, p. 2424, In. 20 - p. 2425, In. 12; Vol. 5, 
p. 3368, In. 8 - p. 3371, In. 5; p. 3377, In. 1 - p. 3378, In. 6. 
Sarah never confessed to killing her parents, despite repeat questioning in the absence of 
counsel by state officials using all manner of techniques designed to obtain confessions. T Tr. 
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Vo!' 4, p. 2179, In. 6-20. In assessing Sarah's failure to confess, it should be noted that she has 
low-average to average general intelligence and ability to learn and retain new information. T Tr. 
Vo!' 7, In. 10-15. 
Sarah did, however, answer repeated questions beginning with those asked by the 911 
operator and continuing throughout the investigation about who might have done this. She said 
that her mother had recently had trouble with a cleaning woman. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1529, In. 23 - p. 
1531, In. 12; Vol. 4, p. 2432, In. 22 - p. 2436, In. 6. 
The weekend before Labor Day, her family hosted Sarah's uncle's wedding at their 
house. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2433, In. 3-4. Many people came and the extended family was all 
together. Sarah's uncle testified that Sarah was extremely helpful and a positive contributor to 
the wedding, acting as chauffeur and personal assistant to the bride for the week. T Tr. Vol. 8, p. 
5899, In. 11-23. As part of the wedding preparations, a cleaning company, Whirlwind Cleaning, 
was hired. T Tr. Vo!' 4, p. 2804, In. 4-6. 
Whirlwind was actually owner Robin Lehat and her employee Janet Sylten. T Tr. Vol. 4, 
p. 2805, In. 1-23. Janet had recently been released from prison on parole. She had served some 
number of years (she claimed that she could not remember the details) for grand theft and battery 
on a correctional officer. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2824, In. 1 - p. 2827, In. 5; Vol. 5, p. 2889, In. 4-6. 
However, the court did not allow the defense to put Ms. Sylten's criminal or incarceration history 
before the jury. T Tr. Vo!' 4, p. 2830, In. 12-21. Janet had gone to work for Robin, moved into 
an apartment Robin owned, and begun dating Robin's boyfriend Russell Nuxoll. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 
2805, In. 18-19; p. 2812, In. 8-17. 
After Robin and Janet cleaned, Diane discovered she was missing two expensive bottles 
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of Estee Lauder lotion. She called Robin who went into Janet's living area and discovered 
Estee Lauder products. Robin questioned Janet who maintained that the bottles belonged to her. 
However, Robin believed that Janet was lying. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2433, In.4-6; Vol. 6, p. 3764, In. 
7 - p. 3765, In. 25. 
Janet refused to return to the Johnsons' with Robin to look for the missing lotions. So, 
while Janet was out, Robin threw her possessions into the yard and left her a note stating that she 
was fired. Robin told the police that she felt threatened by Janet and Russell and that after she 
was evicted, they broke into her house and stole several items. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2811 - p. 2813, 
In. 15; Vol. 6, p. 3776, In. 22 - p. 3779, In. 24. 
Sarah reported that the cleaning woman (Sarah did not know her name) called Diane and 
said something about Diane messing up her life by causing her to be fired. Whatever Janet said 
was threatening and frightening and made Diane cry. Sarah believed that her mother intended to 
contact the police about the stolen items and threats the day she was killed. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1530, 
In. 17-38; p. 1532, In. 6-24; p.1561, In. 17-22; p. 2098, In. 8-9; Vol. 4, p. 2433, In. 17-22.8 
For her part, Janet denied that she ever called Diane and stated she was glad Robin fired 
her because she could now do what she had always wanted to do which was build willow 
furniture with Russ Nuxoll. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2814, In. 12 - p. 2815, In. 22. 
Janet testified that upon being evicted by Robin, she stayed in the willows with Russ. 
The willows were some willow trees along the river in Hailey on land not belonging to Janet and 
8 Kim Richards testified that Sarah first told her about the thefts and threats at Monday 
night volleyball practice. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1531, In. 23 - p. 1533, In. 16. Sheriff Femling testified 
that Sarah told him that the cleaning lady had called Diane while Sarah was at volleyball practice 
on Monday. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2433, In. 17-22. The State argued that this inconsistency pointed to 
Sarah's guilt. T Supp. Tr. p. 184, In. 9-22. 
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Russ. They had no tent or bath facilities. They simply slept in the open in the grove of trees. 
Janet testified that this was where Russ lived "practically all the time." T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 2836, In. 
25 - p. 2841, In. 6. 
Sometime after the murders, Janet and Russ and Robin had all moved to the Magic 
Reservoir, although Janet also lived in Twin Falls for a time. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2831, In. 22 - p. 
2833, In. 13; p. 2835, In. 8-9. 
Sarah said that at about 2:00 a.m. the morning her parents were killed, she was awakened 
by a car and a voice in the backyard. She went with her parents and they all looked out through 
the windows into the yard, seeing lights in the guesthouse and someone in the yard. (The light in 
the guesthouse was unexpected because Mel Speegle was out of town.) Diane said that the voice 
sounded liked Janet's. Alan hugged Sarah and told her not to worry and to go back to bed. T Tr. 
Vol. 3, p. 1529, In. 10-22; p. 1531, In. 8-12; p. 1561, In. 4-7; p. 2095, In. 6 - p. 2098, In. 8; Vol. 
4, p. 2434, In. 10 - p. 2435, In. 23; p. 2694, In. 16-24. 
Janet and Russell were questioned in connection with this case. Janet was concerned 
about answering questions because of her parole status and Russell lied to the police about his 
criminal history. They were sketchy about their whereabouts on the day of the murders; 
however, the officer who questioned them believed that they did not know about the murders and 
noted that Russell was not able to say exactly where they had been because he was worried about 
implicating Janet in something that would violate her parole and because "he did not keep time 
the way most people do." T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 2887, In. 1 - p. 2905, In. 18; p. 2895, In. 3-17. Janet 
denied that she had been at the Johnsons' on September 2. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2822, In. 13-18. 
Following her parents' deaths, Sarah spent days at the Kolash house and nights in the 
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Blaine County minimum security cell with her brother, because her family was afraid that she 
might try to run away with Bruno. However, the Sheriff was clear that this arrangement was just 
to ease the pressure on Sarah's family and that she was not actually in custody. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 
2445, In. 1-22. During this time, Sarah's family wanted her to continue to take Ambien and, 
when she declined, they resorted to trickery, hiding it in her french fries. Sarah discovered the 
ruse and agreed to take the medicine. T Tr. Vol. 7, p. 4554, In. 11-21. 
Shortly after Sarah's arrest, without objection by either herself or Sarah, Ms. Vavold was 
legally terminated as Sarah's guardian. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3365, In. 5-14. 
Sarah spent the year and a half between her arrest and her trial at various adult jails 
throughout Idaho. During that time, IDOC sent a letter to the Judge alerting him to reports that 
Sarah had been raped by an adult male inmate. Upon questioning outside Sarah's presence, her 
counsel told the court that he did not discuss this with Sarah although he had heard about it, 
because, " ... I did not want to put myself in the position of maybe knowing - Of creating a 
situation that at this point does not need to be created, in my opinion." T Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6260, In. 
4 - p. 6264, In. 3. 
The State brought forth the testimony of Malinda Gonzales, a long time drug offender, 
currently serving a prison sentence, who had shared Sarah's cell in Blaine County right after 
Sarah's arrest. 9 T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 3861, In. 13-16; p. 3979, In. 20 - p. 3980, In. 16. Ms. Gonzales 
claimed that while watching a TV show about blood spatter Sarah said she was afraid she would 
be convicted and later said, "When I kill-l mean when the killers killed my parents." T Tr. Vol. 
9 The State was aware that there was a connection between Bruno Santos and Ms. 
Gonzales, but evidence as to the extent of that relationship was not presented. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 
2208, In. 7-11. 
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6, p. 3863, In. 3-6. 
Ms. Gonzales further testified that some of the Hispanic adult male inmates called Sarah 
"La Matadora" and when Ms. Gonzales told her it meant "Little Killer," Sarah was not upset and 
joked about it. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 3868, In. 10 - p. 3869, In. 7. Also, when a male inmate told Ms. 
Gonzalez in a joking way that he wanted Sarah to kill one of the guards, Ms. Gonzalez conveyed 
this request to Sarah. Sarah replied in ajoking way, "Consider it done." (Sarah never made any 
attempt to kill any guard.) T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 3867, In. 21 - p. 3868, In. 6. 
Ms. Gonzales testified that Sarah did not grieve for her parents, was angry with Bruno 
when she heard he was going to testify against her, wanted to beat him up, and wanted to be 
pampered when she got out of jail. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 3869, In. 8 - p. 3871, In. 16. 
Ms. Gonzales also claimed that Sarah said the trash including the robe should have been 
picked up the morning of her parents' deaths, the police tried to put fake bruises on her shoulder 
in the photos they took, she was going to inherit a lot of money, Alan was not Matt's real father 
and his real father was in prison, her lawyers were going to get her off, and Alan and Diane were 
killed because they were not going to let Sarah and Bruno be together. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 3913, In. 
2 - p. 3920, In. 25. 
Ms. Gonzales claimed she was a former assistant city librarian and that Sarah read James 
Patterson's books which are "pretty scary" and about "murder and sadistic, weird stuff."JO T Tr. 
10 The State also presented evidence that Sarah participated in debate in school and one 
of the mock trial cases she had been given concerned murder. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 3799, In. 12 - p. 
3809, In. 19. The implication was that Sarah learned how to commit a murder and outsmart the 
police and courts from debate class and Patterson's books. The defense put on the testimony of a 
fonner attorney and current debate teacher that during the years Sarah participated in debate, 
there was not a murder case as part of the statewide competition and further that the nature of the 
debate practice cases is not such that a child could learn how to commit and get away with a 
20 
6, p. 3863, In. 3-6. 
Ms. Gonzales further testified that some of the Hispanic adult male inmates called Sarah 
"La Matadora" and when Ms. Gonzales told her it meant "Little Killer," Sarah was not upset and 
joked about it. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 3868, In. 10 - p. 3869, In. 7. Also, when a male inmate told Ms. 
Gonzalez in a joking way that he wanted Sarah to kill one of the guards, Ms. Gonzalez conveyed 
this request to Sarah. Sarah replied in a joking way, "Consider it done." (Sarah never made any 
attempt to kill any guard.) T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 3867, In. 21 - p. 3868, In. 6. 
Ms. Gonzales testified that Sarah did not grieve for her parents, was angry with Bruno 
when she heard he was going to testify against her, wanted to beat him up, and wanted to be 
pampered when she got out of jail. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 3869, In. 8 - p. 3871, In. 16. 
Ms. Gonzales also claimed that Sarah said the trash including the robe should have been 
picked up the morning of her parents' deaths, the police tried to put fake bruises on her shoulder 
in the photos they took, she was going to inherit a lot of money, Alan was not Matt's real father 
and his real father was in prison, her lawyers were going to get her off, and Alan and Diane were 
killed because they were not going to let Sarah and Bruno be together. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 3913, In. 
2 - p. 3920, In. 25. 
Ms. Gonzales claimed she was a former assistant city librarian and that Sarah read James 
Patterson's books which are "pretty scary" and about "murder and sadistic, weird stuff."JO T Tr. 
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debate practice cases is not such that a child could learn how to commit and get away with a 
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Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3044, In. 15-21. J J She also found five usable prints on the box of cartridges for the 
rifle which did not match any of the known prints. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3050, In. 13 - p. 3051, In. 11. 
One of the prints on the insert from the box of empty shell casings was made by the same person 
who left the prints on the scope. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3052, In. 11-21. 
In addition, the expended shell casing found in the garage had an unidentified palm print 
on it. T Tr. Vol. 8, p. 5299, In. 6-23. 
In closing, the State discounted the evidentiary value of all the unidentified prints on the 
basis that "the unidentified prints were not left by anyone involved in this case." T Supp. Tr. p. 
317, In. 22 - p. 318, In. 10. 
Two hairs were loosely adhering to the barrel of the rifle. DNA analysis showed that they 
could have come from Diane or anyone in Diane's maternal line. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3023, In. 22 -
p. 3024, In. 12; p. 3411, In. 5-14; Vol. 8, p. 5293, In. 15 - p. 5295, In. 8. 
Sarah's DNA and paint flecks consistent with those on the t-shirt in which she slept were 
on the robe, as expected, as it was her robe. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 3576, In. 1 - p. 3580, In. 15. 
The State's DNA expert found DNA matching Sarah's on the latex glove, but the glove 
was so old that it had become discolored and the expert could not say the DNA was of recent 
origin. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3110, In. 1-3. The expert also found DNA from someone else, not 
matched to any known sample, on that glove. The contributor of that sample could have been 
male or female. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3110, In. 17-20; p. 3120, In. 17-20. 
The leather glove taken from the garbage had Diane's DNA and DNA from Sarah and 
J J Mel Speegle had taken the rifle out of the closet just before the wedding; however, his 
prints were not on it after the shooting. Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2704, In. 8-14; Vol. 5, p. 3028, In. 4-22. 
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possibly Alan. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3125, In. 1-5; p. 3127, In. 22 - p. 3128, In. 2. (Matt testified that 
he had seen Sarah wearing the leather gloves in the past at football games. T Tr. Vol. 8, p. 5805, 
In. 2-4.) Additionally, some unidentified DNA was present inside the glove. Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3184, 
In. 1-15; Vol. 8, p. 5287, In.10 - p. 5288, In. 6. However, the glove had no blood on it which, 
according to expert testimony, meant that it was probably not worn during the shooting. T Tr. 
Vol. 8, p. 5289, In. 25 - p. 5290, In. 12. 
While the rifle had blood and DNA from Alan Johnson and an unknown male on it, 
Sarah's DNA was not on it. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1954, In. 203. Nor did the State present any 
evidence that Sarah's DNA was in the guesthouse, on the knives, on the rifle scope, on the 
cartridge box, on the cartridges or magazine, or on the expelled shells. 
There was DNA from an unidentified male in body tissue found on the collar of robe, 
leading the defense expert to conclude that someone besides Sarah was wearing the robe when 
the Johnsons were shot. T Tr. Vol. 8, p. 5280, In 16 - p. 5286, In. 6. In addition, there were three 
other samples of DNA from unknown persons on the robe and DNA from an unknown male in a 
blood stain on the rifle. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3454, In. 18 - p. 3455, In. 23; Vol. 8, p. 5293, In. 1-10. 
Sarah's socks had Diane's DNA on them. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3122, In. 2-5. 
The State's DNA expert examined Sarah's pajama pants and T-shirt but found no blood. 
T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3189, In. 3-5. 
A recreation of the scene in the Johnsons' bedroom by Mr. Rod Englert was a centerpiece 
of the prosecution. TEx. 324, 325, 326. The jury was out when the State built a bed in the 
courtroom and made it up with the sheets that had been on the bed when Diane died. This 
created a bio-hazard. Proceedings were halted per the motion of the bailiff. 12 The court declared 
a recess, noting that because of the blood and body parts that "have been falling out of the 
exhibits" the trial would stop for the day and the courtroom would be cleaned. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 
4071, In. 1 - p. 4078, In. l. 
The next day Mr. Englert played an animated DVD recreating the shooting of Alan. T Tr. 
VoI.6,p.4156,ln. 7-p.4157,ln. l;p.4160,ln. 19-p.4161,ln.l0. TEx.310. And, then to 
demonstrate the killing of Diane, Mr. Englert donned a pink robe, held the rifle and walked over 
to the recreated bed and aimed it at a mannequin representing Diane. Throughout this 
demonstration, graphic photographs were displayed. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 4204, In. 19 - p. 4210, In. 6; 
p. 4274, In. 10-16. Sarah was so upset by the demonstration and photos that she asked to be 
removed from the courtroom. She watched this portion of the trial on TV.J3 T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 
4158, In. 3-13. 
According to the judge, at least four jurors were so upset and sickened by the 
demonstration and photographs that he almost twice took sua sponte recesses. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 
4215, In. 1-7. Later, one of the jurors did get ill. T Tr. Vol. 7, p. 4777, In. 19-20. 
The State's case also included, without objection, a trip from Ada County where the trial 
was being held to the 10hnson house with a State vehicle escort of the jurors' bus from the 
12 The State maintained the need to have this evidence out despite any risks. Defense 
counsel did not object, saying "we'll do whatever we can to help [the State]." T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 
4072, In. 17 - p. 4073, In. 6. 
13 Sarah cried during an earlier display of photographs of her parents' bodies. The court 
noted that it was an emotional time, but none of the other family members cried, and her crying 
was distracting. In response, defense counsel asked for Sarah to be removed. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 
1994, In. 24 - p. 1998, In. 8. 
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highway to the house. T Tr. Vo!' 4, p. 2158, In. I-p. 2167, In. 19. The jurors were admonished: 
"Your observations during this view of the place involved are not evidence in this case, and you 
are not to take such observations into consideration in arriving at your verdict." T Tr. Vo!' 4, p. 
2361, In. 7 - p. 2265, In. 15. The court commented that the jurors should not be allowed to take 
their notebooks to the house, "because it's not evidence." T Tr. Vo!' 3, p. 2156, In. 7-10. The 
jury also heard testimony that the house had been completely redone since the murders. T Tr. 
Vo!' 3, p. 2085, In. 16-17. 
Sarah was excluded from this trip. The State felt her presence would be prejudicial to it 
and the court suggested that she not be allowed "anywhere near there" as that would present "less 
chance for anything to cause a problem or go south on us." T Tr. Vo!' 3, p. 1920, In. 18 - p. 
1921, In. 9. 
The defense was that Sarah could not be guilty because she did not have blood on her: 
"No blood, no guilt." T Supp. Tr. Vol. 228, In. 3-5. 14 
The defense expert testified that the shooter could not have avoided having blood on 
himlherself. This excluded Sarah as the shooter. T Tr. Vol. 7, p. 4785, In. 1 - p. 4789, In. 16. 
He also testified that there was no evidence that Diane's head was covered at the time she 
was killed; rather, the evidence was consistent with Alan pulling the sheet and comforter over her 
as he came out of the bathroom after being shot. T Tr. Vol. 7, p. 4847, In. 2-6; p. 4851, In. 2-7. 
14 Sarah did not testify at trial. At sentencing, the judge offered the following 
observations: "She maintains her innocence. Wouldn't it be natural or ordinary in our culture to, 
if one is really innocent and protesting their innocence, to do everything in their power to make 
full disclosure to the police, 'I'll help you, I'll give you everything you want, what do you need, 
let's get to the bottom of this, we want to get this resolved'?" The court then stated that Sarah's 
actions in this regard might show her to be unrehabilitatible. T Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6312, In. 24 - p. 
63l3, In. 15. 
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In fact, according to Officer Tremble, the comforter was tucked in tightly over Diane's head. T 
Tr. Vol. 7, p. 5027, In. 1-16. Officer Kirtley also testified that the blanket was "tucked" over 
Diane's head and that "it took some leverage and force to raise those covers." T Tr. Vol. 8, p. 
5217, In. 1 - p. 5220, In. 8. The State did not offer any evidence as to how Diane could have 
tucked a sheet and comforter in tightly over her own head. 
The expert also testified that since so much blood was on the robe and none on the 
gloves, it did not make sense to conclude that the gloves were worn by the shooter. T Tr. Vol. 7, 
p. 4897, In. 15 - p. 4898, In. 2. 
The defense also presented the testimony of Dr. Craig Beaver. Dr. Beaver testified that 
Sarah, even though sexually active, was emotionally immature, and her behavior after the deaths 
of her parents and abandonment by the Vavolds and other family members was normal. At times 
of great loss, people long to be with their peers, hence Sarah's desire to see her friends and 
Bruno. Also, many people attempt to deal with great change and loss by acting as if the loss has 
not happened and Sarah's desire to have her nails done and go to activities like volleyball 
practices and games was consistent with this coping strategy. Dr. Beaver testified that Sarah's 
behavior was normal for a teen who had already been depressed, had suddenly been orphaned, 
was accused of murdering her parents, and then abandoned by all family. T Tr. Vol. 7, p. 4621, 
In. 8 - p. 4635, In. 15. 
Dr. Lundt testified that Zoloft, which Sarah took for depression, often results in blunted 
flat emotions, and she seconded Dr. Beaver's testimony that Sarah's behavior after her parents' 
deaths was not unusual for a teen who had experienced a horrible trauma. T Tr. Vol. 8, p. 5486, 
In. 20 - p. 5492, In. 16. 
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Both Dr. Beaver and Dr. Lundt testified that memory changes over time and the 
inconsistencies in Sarah's statements were to be expected. In fact, it would have been strange if 
there were not inconsistencies. T Tr. Vol. 7, p. 4635, In. 21 - p. 4643, In. 20; Vol. 8, p. 5520, In. 
14 - p. 5524, In. 4. 
The defense also presented evidence that the 10hnsons routinely only locked their front 
door leaving the others unlocked. When the officers entered the 10hnson house that morning, the 
bedroom and kitchen doors to the outside were both open with just the screen doors shut but not 
locked. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1669, In. 7-13; p. 1725, In. 6-10. 
Mel Speegle testified that he kept the exterior of the guesthouse locked, except for the 
back door. He did not keep the interior apartment door locked. And, the family all had access to 
the guesthouse. Alan used the reloading room and computer there. The wedding couple had 
stayed in Mel's living quarters. Matt worked on the building and had stayed there before. And, 
Sarah had been in there alone and with friends with the approval of Mel, who called her "Sweet 
Sarah" and described her as the sweetest thing he had ever known. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2439, In. 16-
20; p. 2692, In. 14 - p. 2693, In. 6; p. 2724, In. 20-25. 
The State's theory was that Sarah knew of the guns hidden in the guesthouse closet. T Tr. 
Vol. 4, p. 2437, In. 18 - p. 2438, In. 24; p. 2439, In. 15-20. However, Mel testified that the guns 
and ammunition were well hidden and that someone just looking into the closet would not see 
them. He testified that someone would have to go through everything to find them. T Tr. Vol. 4, 
p. 2703, In. 1-2; p. 2710, In. 4-12. 
Only Alan, Mel and his wife, and his friend who helped him move into the guesthouse 
clearly knew about the guns. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2702, In. 14 - p. 2703, In. 2; p. 2707, In. 11-22; p. 
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2714, In. 14-22. Mel testified that Sarah might have been present when he and Alan talked about 
putting the guns in a gun safe, but he did not testify that he told Alan where they were hidden. T 
Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2714, In. 14 - p. 2715, In. 7. The bride and groom who stayed in the guesthouse the 
week of the wedding and kept their clothes in the closet, did not see the guns or ammunition; nor 
did Matt who did finishing work inside the closet that same week. T Tr. Vol. 7, p. 4525, In. 22-
p. 4527, In. 16; Vol. 8, p. 5900, In. 8-25. 
The defense also produced testimony of several neighbors. 
Mark Roemer, who went inside the house before the police, said that whoever did this 
had time to get away before anyone else arrived. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1626, In. 10-12. George 
Dondero testified that before hearing Sarah's screams, he and his wife were awakened by noises 
that they had attributed to animals. T Tr. Vol. 3, p.1633, In. 5-18. Ashley Kelbert testified that 
she heard a loud fast car go by at sunrise, which was unusual because the street is a dead end and 
cars don't usually speed there. T Tr. Vol. 8, p. 5455, In. 12 - p. 5460, In. 21. Amber Annen 
testified that she heard a loud zippy car idling and repeatedly circling the area that morning 
between 5:15 and 6:15 or 6:30 a.m. T Tr. Vol. 8, p. 5461, In. 17 - p. 5471, In. 20. 
Robert Kerchusky, fingerprint expert, testified that the scope of the rifle and the insert on 
the box of cartridges contained unknown fingerprints less than a year old that matched each other 
and did not match Sarah, her parents, Bruno, or Mel. The cartridge found in the garage also had 
a useable print that did not match Sarah, her parents, Bruno, or Mel. And, at least ten latent 
prints found at the scene could have been searched through the AFIS system, but the State 
submitted only three of these. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2237, In. 16-18; Vol. 7, p. 5084, In. 13-22; p. 
5087, In. 14 - p. 5088, In. 9; p. 5090, In. 1-21; p. 5091, In. 18 - p. 5095, In. 25. 
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Kjell Elisson, the paramedic who arrived at the Johnsons' about 6:40 a.m., testified that 
he first went into the Johnson house and confirmed that Sarah's parents had been killed. Then, 
he was sent to see Sarah for a medical evaluation at the Richards' house. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1885, 
In. 8-14; p. 1886, In. 23 - p. 1889, In. 9; Vol. 7, p. 5000, In. 14-15. 
Mr. Elisson testified that Sarah was distraught to the point of being hysterical; he took her 
pulse and blood pressure and observed that she did not have any blood visible on her. T Tr. Vol. 
7, p. 5000, In. 25 - p. 5001, In. 10; p. 5003, In. 7-15. After he introduced himself, he asked Sarah 
if there was anything he could do for her and she said, "I just want to know if they're okay." Tr. 
Vol. 7, p. 5001, In. 14-16. At that point, Mr. Elisson realized that Sarah did not know that her 
parents were dead. So, he conferred with the police who gave him permission to tell Sarah. 
And, when he did so, Sarah became even more distraught. Tr. Vol. 7, p. 5001, In. 14 - p. 5002, 
In. 9 Y This was consistent with the testimony of Dorothy Schinella who heard Sarah scream 
when she was told that her parents had died. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1535, In. 8-17. 
Based upon this evidence, Sarah was convicted. 
III. ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the District Court order denying the petition and grant relief for 
two reasons. First, Sarah did not receive the constitutionally required effective assistance of 
counsel. Why Mr. Pangburn's failure to present readily available evidence regarding the 
J5 The State attempted to impeach Mr. Elisson's testimony regarding his observations of 
Sarah and his assessment that she did not realize that her parents had been killed by asking him 
whether he had any prior experience with murderers. The State asked: "During your line of work 
up in Blaine County, have you ever had any contact with anybody who recently committed a 
murder?" T Tr. Vol. 7, p. 5006, In. 15-17 (emphasis added). Mr. Elisson did not answer "Not 
until I met Sarah," or in any other way to indicate a belief in her guilt. Rather, he replied, "I 
don't believe so." T. Tr. Vol. 7, p. 5006, In. 18. 
29 
unidentified fingerprints on the murder weapon, scope and ammunition was constitutionally 
deficient is set forth in Section A below. Second, there is newly discovered evidence regarding 
the fingerprints which: 1) was not available at the time of trial; and 2) is material, i. e., not 
cumulative or merely impeaching. This is discussed in Section B below. Section C will discuss: 
1) why counsel's deficient performance at trial prejudiced Sarah; and 2) why the newly 
discovered evidence would have resulted in an acquittal had the jury known of it. 
A. Sarah Was Denied the Effective Assistance of Counsel at Trial in Violation of the Idaho 
Constitution and the Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel Under 
Strickland v. Washington Due to Counsel's Failure to Discover and Present Available 
Fingerprint Evidence. 
1. Introduction. 
A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has 
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the 
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). Idaho law also guarantees a criminal 
defendant's right to counsel. Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13; I.C. § 19-852. In general, a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or federal constitution, is analyzed 
under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) standard. In order to prevail 
under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's performance was deficient in that it 
fell below standards of reasonable professional performance; and 2) that this deficient 
performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689. The prejudice 
prong of the test is shown if there is a reasonable probability that a different result would have 
been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted properly. ld. 
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Defense counsel is expected to conduct a thorough pretrial investigation of the case. 
State v. Perez, 99 Idaho 181,579 P.2d 127 (1978). "The course of that investigation will 
naturally be shaped by a variety of factors, many peculiar to the particular case. Determining 
whether an attorney's pretrial preparation falls below a level of reasonable performance 
constitutes a question of law, but is essentially premised upon the circumstances surrounding the 
attorney's investigation." Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 
1989) (internal citation omitted). See also Richman v. State, 138 Idaho 190,59 P.3d 995 (Ct. 
App.2002) (Failure to investigate and present evidence concerning defendant's mental condition 
at sentencing constituted deficient performance). 
Here, Sarah's attorney's performance was deficient for failing to elicit testimony from 
Bob Kerchusky that the prints found on the murder weapon, and its scope and ammunition were 
fresh prints and were not deposited at the time the State argued at trial. His failure to do so 
prejudiced Sarah. 
2. Fingerprint Evidence at the Criminal Trial. 
The fingerprint evidence presented during the criminal trial is set forth at pages 21-22 
above. To summarize, none of the 1900 fingerprint comparisons made in this case matched 
Sarah. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3018, In. 14-15. Her prints were not on the leather gloves, the latex 
glove, the pistol magazine, the shell casings, the cartridge box, the knives, or anywhere else. T 
Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3068, In. 9-2l. They were not on the murder weapon or on its removed scope. 
There was, however, a palm print on the rifle which did not match any known prints. T Tr. Vol. 
5, p. 3028, In. 10-12. And, there were four unmatched prints on the rifle scope, three of which 
could have come from the same person. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3044, In. 15-21. The fingerprints on the 
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scope also matched a print found on the insert from the ammunition box. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3052, 
In. 11-21. 
The defense fingerprint expert, Bob Kerchusky, testified about the aging of fingerprints: 
Q .... Now, my question started as to age. First of all, what -- in your experience, 
what age are you -- how long are those fingerprints going to last? 
A. Well, we can't be sure how long they're going to last. The only thing, as far as a 
gun is concerned, pretty much on my experience, after a year, they're just about 
gone, as far as I'm concerned. 
Q. Okay, why is that? 
A. Because the oily matter, perspiration dries up and dissipates. It's the same thing 
with the stock, is a good area on the gun. You'll have it on there, and it will be the 
same thing. After a period of time, it will dry up. 
Q. Okay, let me give you a bit of a hypothetical here and see if it's a way to make 
this idea of drying up understandable. You have already told us that fingerprints 
are made up by either body oils or perspiration; which is what? Water, mainly? 
A. Basically, yeah. 
Q. Okay, and you said that they dry up. And they're not -- They just disappear, 
they go away? 
A. (No response.) 
Q. I'm getting to my hypothetical. 
A. You're getting into you don't know if somebody's wiping it down. Suppose 
somebody -- You know, there's so many variables that could happen in there. 
Q . Well, let me tighten it up. Let's assume, for the purposes of my hypothetical, 
that we have got a gun, and that gun is not exposed to any other environmental 
elements. It's not wiped by someone, it's not periodically brushed up against by 
someone. Let's just assume -- And I know this is likely to be something that 
would not happen, but let's say this gun isjust standing in the middle of the room, 
but it's in a room. It's subject to the atmosphere that we all live in. Are you telling 
me that those fingerprints will disappear like if! were to set a glass of water, 
maybe an inch-worth of water in a glass? Now, that water is going to evaporate 
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over the course of a year, wouldn't it? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Are those oils and fingerprints just like that? 
A. Yes. They will evaporate over a period of time, or dissipate over a period of 
time. 
Q. Even if there's not something else like being rubbed down, brushed, touched by 
other people happening? 
A. That's true. The thing about it is a lot of times there could be something, an 
image that looks like the fingerprint was still there, but it will never come off, 
because it's already dried up. I seen that before. 
T Tr. Vol. 7, p. 5070, In. 6 - p. 5072, In. 10. 
Mr. Kurchusky was never asked by defense counsel whether he had an opinion about the 
age of the fingerprints found on the rifle, scope and ammunition. And, on cross-examination, the 
prosecutor carefully avoided asking the missing question: 
Q. Okay, so really, without knowing exactly the quality of the print when it was originally 
left, and then the circumstances under which that item has been kept, there's really no way 
to age a latent print, isn't that correct? 
A. I wouldn't say that. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Because my experience, they're not going to last forever, let's put it that way. 
Q. Okay, that's fair. But you can't look at a print and, based solely upon the print itself, 
say "well, that's two weeks old, or two months old, or two years old"? 
A. No. But I still would have an opinion as far as whether it's a fresh print or not. 
Q. Okay, so you would have an opinion about that? 
A. That's correct. 
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Q. Okay, let's talk a little bit about the issue that you were talking about with doorknobs 
and wiping off prints from a doorknob. 
T Tr. Vol, 7, p. 5107, In. 17 - p. 5108, In. 12. 
Notwithstanding the broad hint given to him by Mr. Kerchusky, defense counsel did not 
elicit the opinion on re-direct examination. 
Q. You know, the state again asked you, well, you can't tell how old fingerprints can get 
to be, or how old a fingerprint is, I think is what they said. 
A. You can't give an age, is what it amounts to. 
Q. Okay, but based on your experience, your training, your knowledge, your over 50 years 
in this business, are latent prints on a nonporous surface like a gun going to last, typically, 
more than a year? 
A. As I referred back to my report, I gave it a year when I did six guns, and they were all 
rifles or shotguns. And basically speaking, that's what I used; my last, you know, 12 years 
or so for when I was with the state police. 
T Tr. Vol. 7, p. 5128, In. 13 - p. 5129, In. l. 
To summarize: Mr. Kerchusky testified that he had an opinion about the freshness of the 
fingerprints, but was never asked to state that opinion or explain the basis of his opinion to the 
JUry. It turns out that Mr. Kerchusky's opinion as to the freshness was critical to Sarah's defense. 
3. Fingerprint Evidence at the Evidentiary Hearing Regarding the Strickland 
Claim. 
The fingerprint evidence at the evidentiary hearing centered around two topics. The first 
topic was the post-trial match of the previously unidentified prints on the rifle, its scope and 
ammunition. That evidence pertains to the newly discovered evidence claim and is set forth in 
Section B below. The second topic regarded the claim that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to present available fingerprint evidence to the jury. 
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As to the latter topic, Mr. Kerchusky testified that Mr. Pangburn failed to bring out highly 
pertinent facts during his testimony at the criminal trial, particularly that the unknown prints 
found on the rifle and elsewhere had been recently deposited. 
Q. All right. And didn't you also come up with, have an opinion that certain of 
those latent prints were - were fresh prints? 
A. Oh, yes. Yeah. 
Q. And upon which did you base your opinion that those prints were fresh? And 
if you could, just tell us which prints is it that it was your opinion that they were 
fresh; and upon what did you base your opinion? 
A. Okay. We could start with the scope. The scope was - there was three latent 
fingerprints that were recovered from that scope, And when I looked at the, the 
scope it appeared, the drawing that I had that they were in an upward position or 
they could have been on the side latent fingerprints. 
Q. All right. 
A. According to the arrow that she had pointing up. And also that the fingers were 
real close together, as if somebody was pushing it real hard as you would unscrew 
a screw, is what it comes down to. And two of the latent prints were from the 
number 3 finger, which is the [right] middle finger. And one came from the 
number 4 finger, which is the [right] index finger. And I felt that, with that and 
also the fact that the scope is covered twice with clothing - when he moved I 
don't know if the clothing was on there. Ifit was, there would have been no latent 
fingerprints on there from the beginning. But ifhe moved and then put the 
clothing on, he would have left his fingerprints on there; and then when he went 
ahead and put the, either the material or - I think it was clothing is what he said -
and then you come to realize that when he went two weeks before the wedding, he 
went in, took the gun out and then checked the gun out and the scope was on there 
and everything else, and then he went back and wrapped it up again and put it 
back, so that was twice that it was wrapped. 
Q. And when you say "he" you're referring to Mel Speegle? 
A. Mel Speegle, that's correct. 
Q. All right. Go on. 
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A. Mel Speegle, right? 
Q. Okay. And go on with your answer. 
A. And with those factors, it was my opinion it had to be fresh prints, because 
most - Mr. Speegle's fingerprints were not on that gun after him handling it and 
all. So what happened to them? Most likely they were wiped off when this 
clothing or whatever he had to cover it up, because he covered these things up. So 
if that happened, that would be the same thing as far as the stock is concerned, it 
would be the same thing. And also the fact that there were fresh prints, because 
there were no etched prints going into that, that metal scope, And that was two of 
the key factors as far as those latents were concerned. 
Now as far as the bullet is concerned, that is the one where they got a latent 
fingerprint off the one bullet, That was a loaded bullet. It had a - one of the best 
latents I'd ever seen on there. nd the reason why I'm saying this is because a 
bullet is cylinder, and a lot of times you don't leave a lot of friction ridge on, but 
this was an excellent latent print, and that was not etched into the bullet itself. It 
was lifted off. Once you could lift it off, its not etched into there. 
And then as far as the insert, the plastic insert, well, he moved. And that insert 
was not, according to the testimony he gave in trial. He stated that that insert, he 
was never inside that, those box of bullets to take an inventory. He was asked 
about an inventory. He said for ten years it was, he never went in there to take an 
inventory on there. So that means those latents had to be fresh because they were 
not - that insert was not touched for ten years. 
EH Tr. p. 825, In. 4 - p. 828, In. 13. 
Q. Now, so you have told us that you formed an opinion that these were fresh 
prints; and you've told us the basis upon which you formed your opinion. Did you 
share that with trial counsel, with Mr. Pangburn or with Mr. Rader? 
A. Yes I did. 
Q. Okay. Even so, if you recall, what did you tell Mr. Pangburn or Mr. Rader were 
the most important of the opinions or observations that you formed based upon 
your review of the materials that you - that you have told the court that you 
reviewed? What were the most imp0l1ant fingerprint things that you told 
36 
Pangburn and Rader? 
A Probably the most important things would have been, again, the bullet because 
that was one of the key things, because it would have been etched within months, 
as far as I was concerned and as far as my expertise is concerned. And that was 
one of the key issues as far as I was concerned, was that bullet had that latent 
fingerprint on there. 
Q. Okay. And so you - is it fair to say that you emphasized the freshness of the print on, 
on that shell to trial counsel, told them, ask me this stuff while we're - while we're in 
trial? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. All right. At trial did Mr. Pangburn ask you your opinion about whether the 
print, the latent prints, on the scope were fresh prints. Did he ask you that 
question? 
ANo. 
Q. Did Mr. Pangburn at trial ask you the question about your opinion on whether 
the print on the - on the bullet was a fresh print? 
A.No. 
Q. And did he ask you your opinion about the freshness of any of these latent 
prints? 
ANo. 
Q. After you testified at trial, did you say anything to Mr. Pangburn about your 
testimony? Did you - well did you say anything to him about your testimony? 
AYes. I told him there was quite a few things we forgot to bring up .... And as 
you know, those are fresh prints; and why he didn't bring it up, I don't know. 
Q. And you told him? 
A I told him, yeah. 
Q. After trial, you told him, you need to put me - or excuse me - after your testimony, did 
you ask him to put you back on the witness stand? 
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A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And did he do so? 
A. No. He says, I don't think it's needed at this time. So-
Q. And this was even after you testified, he still said it's not needed? 
A. That's what he told me. 
EH Tr. p. 829, In. 20 - p. 832, In. 20. 
Mr. Pangburn recalled having a discussion about "how long fingerprints would stay in 
existence" and that it was his recollection that "it would be very unlikely that they would last 
beyond a year." EH Tr. g. 407, In. 21 - pg. 408, In. 6. Beyond that, he did not have any 
recollection of discussing fresh prints with Mr. Kerchusky. EH Tr. p. 408, In. 14-16. ("And to 
the extent that's what you mean by fresh, less than a year old, yeah, I do recall that.") 
Mr. Kerchusky summarized his professional opinions as follows: 
[T]he prints that were on the scope were fresh because, first of all, they had 
material on them that wiped them down a couple times, and that the latents were 
in that position where it was held real tight like this (indicating). In my opinion, it 
was somebody that was trying to unscrew the scope. And also that they were not 
etched into that metal at all, because they lifted them off; and it had to be a fresh 
print that was on that. 
EH Tr. p. 847, In. 22 - p. 848, In. 17. 
In addition, the location of the prints on the scope also indicated that it had been recently 
handled. Mr. Kerchusky testified that the fingerprints appeared to be in an upwards position 
which would consistent with someone removing the scope, but inconsistent with someone 
grabbing or touching it to sight it. EH Tr. p. 849, In. 3 - p. 850, In. 20. It is apparent that the 
scope was removed just before the murders as it was found on the bed in Mel Speegle's 
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bedroom. 
As to the live bullet, Mr. Kerchusky's opinion was "that was a fresh print, because it 
would have etched into the brass if it was not a fresh print, because it only takes months before 
the acid starts eating into that brass surface." EH Tr. p. 851, In. 2-6. 
It was Mr. Kerchusky's opinion that whomever left the unknown prints (later to be 
identified as Christopher Hill) was the last person to touch the .264 rifle and the last person to 
touch the scope. Elf Tr. p. 854, In. 7-19. 
4. The Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
The District Court made the following findings of facts regarding this claim. 
219. At trial, Tina Walthall, (Walthall) a fingerprint examiner with the Idaho State 
Police, testified that she received fingerprint cards from Johnson, Bruno Santos, 
Alan Johnson, Diane Johnson, Mel Speegle, Janet Sylten (the cleaning lady), 
Russell Nuxoll (the cleaning lady's boyfriend), Matthew Johnson (Johnson's 
brother) and Robin LeHat (the cleaning lady's employer). (TT 3009: 16-20). 
220. Walthall used these print cards to compare with the prints lifted from the crime 
scene. (TT 3018:2-5). After those comparisons, certain fingerprints taken from 
the crime scene remained unidentified, including fingerprints found on the stock 
of the rife (Id., 3027:20-3028:2.2), the scope from the rifle (Id., 3042:22-3044:2), 
and two boxes of .264 shells (Id., 3049:-3052:3). 
221. A search of the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) prior 
to trial using three of the unidentified prints also revealed no matches to any of the 
unidentified fingerprints. (TT 3045:1-3046:10,3053:5-11,3066:1-13). 
222. Walthall repeatedly testified there is no way to date a fingerprint to determine 
when it was left (TT 3028:13-17, 3044:22-25, 3052:22-25; 3058:19-3062:11, 
3073 :5-15). Walthall specifically stated: (l) "many, many years can pass and you 
might still find usable fingerprints on" paper or cardboard (TT 3060: 1 0-11); (2) 
she has discovered prints off of nonporous surfaces more than a year later (id., 
3061 :4-5); (3) one would expect to find fingerprints more than a year old if 
nothing happened between "when they were deposited and when [they were] 
processed" (id., 3061 :20-25); and (4) "it is probable that a fingerprint would last 
up to and exceeding a year, providing there has been nothing to damage that 
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fingerprint in the interim," which is true even on a nonporous surface (id., 3062:3-
6). 
223. The defense called Kerchusky to testify at Johnson's trial and again before 
the District Court at the evidentiary hearing. 
224. During the trial, Kerchusky was asked by Pangburn how long fingerprints 
can last. He replied that "we can't be sure how long they're going to last," but that 
"pretty much on my experience, after a year, they're just about gone, as far as I'm 
concerned." (TT 5070:6-12; see also 5128:18-5129:16 (latent prints on a non-
porous surface will not last more than one year). 
225. Kerchusky further testified that fingerprints will dry up and evaporate over the 
course of one year. (TT 5074:7-9). Kerchusky also agreed, however, that it is 
fair to say that a fingerprint on a box could last for years and years and years. (Id., 
5075:9-14). 
226. Mr. Kerchusky, however, acknowledged that aging of fingerprints on nonporous 
surfaces is a controversial subject because "there's so many variables as far 
as weather, where it's located. I mean there's so many things that come into it, 
there's no way in the world anybody could write any article on it." (TT 5107:3-6). 
227. Kerchusky also acknowledged that fingerprints on porous surfaces can last for 
years and that there are some "rare" instances where a latent print that was over a 
year old could be found on a nonporous surface. (TT 5130:8-16). Kerchusky 
further testified that although he could not determine how old a fingerprint is, he 
"still would have an opinion as far as whether it's a fresh print or not." (TT 
5108:1-6). 
228. In 2009, approximately four years after Johnson's criminal trial, Walthall 
compared the unidentified prints from the murder scene to prints belonging to Mr. 
Christopher Kevin Hill (Hill). (PCHT 652:2-21). Walthall testified at the post-
conviction evidentiary hearing that, of the previously unidentified fingerprints, 
Hill's matched those that were found on the scope, the boxes of ammunition, and 
the rifle. (Id., 654:2-22; see also p. 659:11-14). 
229. Walthall also testified, as she did at trial, about "aging" fingerprints and how long 
fingerprints can last. (See generally PCHT, pp.661-670). Walthall reiterated the 
opinion previously expressed at trial that fingerprints can last longer than a year. 
(Id.,670:4-11). 
230. Mr. Kerchusky also testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. (See 
generally PCHT pp. 538~638). Kerchusky's post-conviction testimony was 
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substantially similar to his trial testimony in that he testified that fingerprints left 
on nonporous surfaces "will be gone within a year." (Jd., 553:15-554:10). 
231. Kerchusky also refelTed to the prints on the rifle, scope, and ammunition 
(Christopher Kevin Hill's prints) as "fresh" because, according to him, any prints 
left on the gun before Mr. Speegle put it in his closet would have been wiped off 
by the clothes hanging in his closet and because the prints were not "etched." 
(PCHT 589:2-15; see also id., 609:22-610:17, 612:21-6l3:21). 
232. With respect to the new information that some of the previously unidentified 
fingerprints had been matched to Mr. Hill, Kerchusky testified that, in his opinion, 
Hill was the last person to touch the .264 rifle and scope and that it was Hill 
who removed the scope. (PCHT 615:23-616: 19). However, Kerchusky admitted 
on cross-examination (as he did at trial) that he has no way of knowing when 
fingerprints are placed on any given item. (Jd., 627: 15-17). 
233. At the evidentiary hearing before this court, Kerchusky found fault with 
Pangburn because Pangburn did not ask him specifically whether the unknown 
fingerprints were "fresh." Kerchusky testified that several of the prints were 
fresh, and that he had spoken to Pangburn during the trial, requesting that 
Pangburn put him back on the stand to discuss the freshness of the prints, but that 
Pangburn declined to do so. 
234. It was implied, if not expressed at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, that 
Pangburn's examination and presentation of Kerchusky's testimony was 
insufficient because Pangburn was inadequately prepared to present the expert, 
based upon the original plan for Pangburn to handle just the lay witnesses. 
235. The court does not accept this proposition for two reasons: first, the record of 
Pangburn's examination sets forth that he was prepared for the examination, 
and that he discussed various hypotheticals that brought the pertinent issue (aging 
of fingerprints) before the jury for Kerchusky to comment on. (E.g. TT:5071-
5072); second, the record also establishes that Pangburn conducted the cross-
examination of the state's fingerprint expert, Ms. Walthall, on February 16,2005, 
more than two weeks before Kerchusky's examination on March 3, 2005. (Jd., 
5044: 15). Clearly the decision for Pangburn to handle the fingerprint evidence 
was decided long before Kerchusky took the stand in March. 
236. At trial Pangburn began his cross-examination of Ms. Walthall with questions 
regarding "this idea about aging fingerprints," (IT 3058:11-12), and he inquired 
further regarding the defense theory that fingerprints would dissipate after 
approximately one year. (Jd., 3060:7-3062: 11). 
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237. The court concludes from the nature and extent of Pangburn's cross-examination 
that he was well-aware of the defense theory regarding aging/freshness of 
fingerprints by February 2005. Thus, Pangburn's examination of Kerchusky was 
not a last-minute, shoot-from-the-hip situation, but it was, in accord with 
Pangburn's testimony, to get him involved some in the scientific aspect of the 
case and to take some of the load off Rader. 
238. The court therefore concludes that the defense, through Pangburn, had a definite 
strategy regarding the fingerprints; that Pangburn was aware of this strategy 
well-ahead of his examination of Kerchusky and that he, as a matter of strategy, 
asked the questions he chose to ask of Kerchusky without asking about 
"freshness" per se. 
239. Pangburn was prepared regarding the defense fingerprint theory, and he 
exercised his judgment and skill in presenting those issues to the jury. He also 
argued the freshness of the fingerprints to the jury in his closing. (See 
Supplemental Appeal Transcript, 270: 11-272:25) ("You know, these things start 
getting a year old, and you're just not going to see it. ... Those fingerprints had not 
been there for very long."). 
PC R Vol. 7, pp. 1889-95. 
5. The District Court's Conclusions of Law. 
The District Court made the following conclusions of law. 
89. As the court has concluded based on the record in this case, Pangburn was 
adequately prepared regarding the forensic/fingerprint testimony in the 
10hnson trial. He inquired of the state's expert regarding aging to 
fingerprints, and he inquired similarly of Mr. Kerchusky regarding the 
same Issues. 
90. The information regarding the freshness of the prints was before the jury 
from both Pangburn's direct examination of Kerchusky, and from his 
cross-examination of Ms. Walthall. Moreover, Pangburn in fact argued 
that when the fingerprints "start getting a year old ... You're just not 
going to see [them]." He also argued that the unknown fingerprints, which 
have now been identified as those of Christopher Hill "had not been there 
for very long." (Supplemental Appeal Transcript, 270:11-272:25). 
91. Thus, Pangburn did not err in failing to specifically ask whether the prints 
were "fresh" or in failing to ask Kerchusky those questions which 
Kerchusky answered at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing regarding 
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who, in his opinion, touched the scope last. 
92. The court therefore concludes that Pangburn's questions of Kerchusky at 
trial do not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. The court 
further concludes that Johnson has not overcome the "strong presumption 
that trial counsel's performance falls within the wide range of 
'professional assistance' Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 
104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 
P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). 
PC R Vo!.7, pg. 1916-1917. 
6. The Court's Finding That Counsel's Failure to Further Question Kerchusky 
About the Freshness of the Fingerprints Was Strategic is Not Supported By 
Substantial Evidence. Its Conclusion That Counsel's Performance Was Adequate 
is Not Supported By the Record or Logic; In Fact, Counsel's Performance Was 
Deficient. 
(aJ Standard of review. 
"When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, strategic and tactical 
decisions will not be second-guessed or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief unless the 
decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or 
other shortcomings capable of objective review." Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 561, 149 P.3d 
833,836 (2006), citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 584, 6 P.3d 831, 834 (2000). In the context 
ofa criminal trial, establishing the overarching theory of the case to obtain the defense goal (e.g., 
acquittal, conviction on a lesser-included offense, or avoidance of the death penalty in a capital 
case) is the defense strategy. Tactics are the means by which the defense strategy is to be 
implemented. Thus, the precise topics to be covered in the direct examination of a defense 
expert witness involve tactical decisions informed by the defense strategy. As will be shown 
below, the Estrada standard has been met here because there could be no strategic or tactical 
reason for counsel's inaction. See e.g., A1cKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571,225 P.3d 700, 704 
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(2010) ("Since ... there is no conceivable tactical justification for trial counsel's failure to object 
... McKay's trial attorney was objectively deficient in that regard. "). 
(b) The Court'sjinding of a strategic purpose is not supported by the evidence. 
The District Court "conclude[ d] that the defense, through Pangburn, had a definite 
strategy regarding the fingerprints ... and that he, as a matter of strategy, asked the questions he 
chose to ask of Kerchusky without asking about 'freshness' per se." PC R Vol. 7, p. 1894. 
However, the conclusion that Pangburn made a reasoned decision to forego asking the 
appropriate questions, whether labeled a strategy or a tactic, is not supported by the evidence or 
logic. Further, given the defense theory of the case, Pangburn's decision to forego the 
questioning is a shortcoming capable of objective review. Thus, the court erred in concluding 
there was a strategy at work. 
First, the court never identifies the strategic purpose the omission served. Thus, its 
conclusion was made without context. But, when the strategy is identified, it is clear the court 
erred. In fact, the defense strategy was to argue that the largely circumstantial evidence linking 
Sarah to the crimes was disproved by the physical and forensic evidence which pointed to 
someone else being the killer. See Findings of Fact ~~ 85-88, PC R Vol. 7, p. 1857. Pangburn's 
shorthand phrase for this strategy was "No blood, no guilt." ld. An important, but by no means 
exclusive, piece of evidence in support of this strategy was the total absence of blood on Sarah 
even though the bathrobe she supposedly wore during the crimes was covered with blood and 
gore. In addition, the defense strategy was to demonstrate the absence of forensic evidence 
linking Sarah to the shooting and present evidence showing that someone else committed the 
offenses. This is clear in the closing arguments to the jury when Pangburn told the jury that 
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"[ u ]sually, what happens is [the] state puts on its case, it says, 'This person did this, here are the 
facts.' But that's not what you have seen in this case. What you have really seen is the inverse. 
You have seen the defense bring on experts to prove a case, to point directly at other people." Tr. 
Supp. T p. 251, In. 21 - pg. 252, In. 8. 
The answers to the unasked questions would have significantly furthered the defense 
strategy as expressly articulated by Pangburn at the trial. Mr. Kerchusky would have testified 
that it was his opinion that Sarah was not the last person to touch the rifle. He would have 
opined that the person who left the (then) unidentified fingerprint and palm print was the last 
person to touch the murder weapon. Mr. Kerchusky would have also testified that the prints on 
the scope were fresh otherwise they would have been wiped off by the material that covered it in 
the closet. Further, the prints on the scope were deposited at the time the unknown person 
removed the scope from the rifle, i. e., just prior to the murders. Finally, he would have testified 
that the print on the live bullet "was a fresh [latent] print ... because it only takes months before 
the acid starts eating into that brass surface." PC EH p. 851, In. 2-6. All these facts fit into the 
defense strategy. In fact, Pangburn argued in closing that "[t]hose fingerprints had not been there 
for very long. They couldn't have been. So there they are, you have fingerprints inside the box 
of bullets that match the scope, the gun that killed the -- the scope off the gun that killed these 
people." Tr. Supp. T, p. 272, In. 21-25. But, he could not argue the details of how fresh the 
prints were, i.e., very recent instead of being placed within a year, why Mr. Kerchusky came to 
this conclusion, or why the prints on the scope were placed there by the person who was not 
Sarah and who took off the scope just prior to the murders. Pangburn did not deprive himself of 
the evidence needed to support those arguments as a matter of strategy. Instead, he laid the 
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foundation for the evidence, but then neglected to ask the questions. As Mr. Kerchusky's 
missing evidence would have been highly supportive of the defense strategy, there could not have 
been a strategic reason to not ask those questions. 
This conclusion is further supported by Pangburn's testimony at the evidentiary hearing. 
Pangburn never testified that he had any reason for his decision to not ask the freshness 
questions. He never even testified that the omission was purposeful or that it happened as the 
result of a decision reasoned or not at all. He did not even recall having a discussion about 
freshness. All he knew was that "it would be very unlikely that they would last beyond a year." 
PC EH Tr. p. 407, In. 21 - p. 408, In. 6. He did not have any recollection of discussing fresh 
prints with Mr. Kerchusky beyond that. PC EH Tr. p. 408, In. 14-16. Thus, Pangburn's 
testimony does not support the court's conclusion. 
Moreover, Kerchusky's testimony affirmatively disproves it. He testified that he told 
Pangburn that "there was quite a few things we forgot to bring up .... And as you know, those 
are fresh prints; and why he didn't bring it up, I don't know." After Mr. Kerchusky asked to be 
put back on the witness stand, Pangburn refused saying "I don't think it's needed at this time." 
PC Tr. EH p. 829, In. 20 - p. 832, In. 20. Pangburn did not deny Mr. Kerchusky's version ofthe 
events during his testimony. But the evidence was needed, obviously, as the defense was not so 
strong that Pangburn could reasonably decide to forego presenting highly exculpatory evidence 
which was totally supportive of his defense strategy. 
(c) There is no conceivable tactical purpose for counsel's inaction. 
The evidence which could have been presented by Mr. Kerchusky was not and could not 
have been presented by any other witness. Thus, there was no conceivable tactical purpose for 
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Pangburn's failure to bring out the strategically important evidence during Kerchusky's direct 
examination. Nor was there any tactical reason for failing to recall Mr. Kerchusky after Mr. 
Kerchusky informed Pangburn of the shortcomings in the examination and insisted that he be 
recalled to complete his testimony. 
(d) The record does not support the Court's conclusion that counsel's 
performance was constitutionally adequate. 
In light of the obvious value of the evidence and the absence of a strategic or tactical 
reason to not present the evidence, the District Court's conclusion that counsel's performance in 
this regard was constitutionally adequate is in error and cannot stand. 
7. Counsel's Deficient Performance was Prejudicial. 
The reasons why counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial under Strickland v. 
Washington will be discussed in Section C below. 
B. The Newly Discovered Fingerprint Evidence Was Not Available Prior to Trial and Was 
Material. 
1. Facts Pertaining to Claim. 
In addition to the testimony about the freshness of the prints, there was also evidence that 
the previously unidentified prints on the murder tools had been matched after the trial to 
Christopher Hill, a friend of Mel Speegle. 
Maria Eguren, an Idaho State Police employee in the Bureau of Criminal Identification, 
received the unknown fingerprints from the murder weapon and elsewhere on November 21, 
2003. PC EH, p. 751, In. 25 - p. 752, In. 1. She entered them into the AFIS (Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System) unit and did not come up with a hit. PC EH pg. 762, In. 3-10. 
She continued to run the prints on a regular basis until January of 2009, when she received a 
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match. PC EH Tr. p. 764, In. 1-3. The match was Christopher Kevin Hill, who, it tumed out, 
was a former employee and friend ofMr. Speegle. PC Tr. EH p. 766, In. 4-7. Mr. Hill's 
fingerprints were not entered into the AFIS system until March 15, 2007, well after the 2005 
criminal trial. PC EH Tr. p. 772, In. 23 - p. 773, In. 25. Ms. Eguren did not confirm the match 
herself, instead she tumed the matter over to Tina Walthall, for examination. 
Ms. Walthall, a fingerprint examiner, compared Mr. Hill's prints to the unknown prints 
and confirmed that three of his prints were on the rifle scope and two of his prints were on the 
box of that rifle's ammunition which was found in Mel Speegle's closet. PC EH p. 891, In. 18 -
p. 892, In. 13. In particular, prints from Mr. Hill's right middle finger and right ring fingers were 
found on the scope. She also found Mr. Hill's left thumbprint on a live cartridge from the 
ammunition and another right middle fingerprint on the plastic insert found in the ammunition 
box. Finally, Mr. Hill's left palm print was also found on the rifle. PC EH Tr. p. 893, In. 2 - pg. 
896, In. 5. 
Even though a match had been made, no one from the State alerted Sarah or her lawyers. 
Instead, that information only came to light because Mr. Kerchusky called Ms. Eguren at home to 
inquire about the case. She said that, "[h]e called me several times, And I wasn't telling him. He 
told me, well, I have to rerun the case. And then after several conversations with him, it slipped 
outthatIdidgetahit." PCEHp. 767,ln.1O-15. 
It was Mr. Kerchusky's opinion that Christopher Hill was the last person to touch the .264 
rifle and the last person to touch the scope. PC EH p. 854, In. 7-19. 
Christopher Hill denied having anything to do with the murders. He testified that he was 
at his campsite on East Magic Reservoir Road "on the specific night of the murders." PC EH pg. 
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965, In. 15-17. 
2. The Court's Findings of Fact. 
240. Mel Speegle, (Speegle) was the tenant in the guesthouse at the time of the 
murders. He is also the owner of the .264 rifle used to murder the 10hnsons. 
241. Speegle testified at trial that: (l) he kept the rifle in his closet along with three 
other guns (TT 2702:8-2703:2); (2) the guns were not locked (id., 2703:3-8); (3) 
he saw the guns the weekend prior to the murders at which time the scope was 
still on the .264 rifle (id., p.2704:6-2706:8); (4) he had only fired the .264 three 
times, ten years prior (id., 2706: 17-21); (5) he cleaned the .264 in 1993 (id., 
2708:2-9); and (6) he has no idea how many people touched the .264 rifle, but his 
wife and a friend helped him move into the guesthouse (id., 2707:11-22). 
242. Speegle also testified that 10hnson had access to his apartment, that 10hnson knew 
he would be gone the weekend before the murders, and that the .264 rifle, as well 
as his other guns and ammunition, were in the closet when 10hnson cleaned his 
apartment and stayed there with friends. (TT 2693:17-20,2694:25-2696:6, 
2715:12-25). 
243. Speegle and Hill also both testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing 
before this court. Speegle testified that he moved into the guesthouse on the 
10hnson property in "approximately 2002." (PCHT 699:10-15). 
244. Hill helped Speegle move from his "ranch house" into the 10hnson guest house. 
(Id., 700:18-20, 703:20-23). Hill was a "good friend" of Speegle's and had been a 
caretaker at Speegle's ranch house where he had access to Speegle's .264 rifle. 
(Id., p.704: 1-4, 11-13, 724: 10-20). To Speegle's knowledge, Hill did not have 
access to the 10hnson guest house. (Id., 704:8-10). 
245. Hill confirmed that he was the caretaker for Speegle's ranch and that he helped 
Speegle move "a few things" into the 10hnson guest house. (PCHT 726: 14-17, 
727 :5-12). Hill also confirmed that he did not have access to the guest house. 
(ld.,727:13-16). 
246. Hill specifically, and credibly, denied any involvement in the murders of Alan and 
Diane, noting he did not even hear about the murders until about one week after 
they occurred because he had been camping. (Id.,728:5-20). 
247. In explaining why his prints would be on the .264 rifle, other than having possibly 
left them when he helped Speegle move, Hill testified that, during the springtime 
in 2000, while he was caretaking at Speegle's ranch, he "took[the rifle] out, tried 
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to sight it," and shot it "six or seven times" using Speegle's ammunition. (PCHT 
728:21-729:7; see also 729:24-731:21). 
PC R Vol. 7, p. 1895-96. 
3. The District Court's Conclusions of Law. 
The court made the following conclusions of law when denying the petition: 
104. . .. [T]he court concludes that this identification meets the first prong of 
Drapeau because the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to 
Johnson at the time of trial. 
105. The court also finds that the fourth Drapeau prong is met; the discovery of 
the identity of the unknown fingerprints had nothing to do with the 
defendant's conduct. 
106. However, Johnson has failed to meet her burden of establishing that the 
discovery that Mr. Hill's fingerprints on the .264 rifle, scope, and 
ammunition boxes is material or would likely produce an acquittal on a 
retrial. 
R Vol. 7, p. 1920-21. 
4. A New Trial Should Have Been Granted. 
A post-conviction petition raising a claim based on newly discovered evidence is 
considered like a new trial motion. The petitioner is entitled to relief when the evidence is newly 
discovered and was unknown to the petitioner at the time of trial; the evidence is material, not 
merely cumulative or impeaching; it will probably produce an acquittal; and, the failure to learn 
of the evidence was due to no lack of diligence on the part of the petitioner. State v. LePage, 138 
Idaho 803, 807, 69 P.3d 1064,1068 eCt. App. 2003), citing State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 
551 P.2d at 978. Here, all four requirements were met. 
(a) The evidence is newly discovered. 
The trial court found that the evidence was newly discovered. PC R Vol. 7, p. 1920. 
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(b) Thefailure to learn o[the evidence was not due to lack of diligence. 
The trial cOUl1 also found that this prong of the Drapeau test was present. !d. 
(c) It is material. 
The District Court first erred by finding that the newly discovered evidence was not 
material. Under Drapeau, evidence is "material" if it is "not merely cumulative or impeaching." 
State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691, 551 P.2d 972,978 (1976). "Whether a fact is material is 
determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties." State v. Stevens, 
146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217, 221 (2008) citing State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443, 180 
P.3d 476,482 (2008). 
Here, the newly discovered evidence is not cumulative because there was no evidence at 
trial that Christopher Hill was the last person to touch the murder weapon. And, the evidence is 
not merely impeaching. There was no evidence at the trial that the fingerprints could be traced to 
anyone, much less to someone who admitted to firing the weapon. 
The difference between impeachment evidence and substantive evidence has been 
explained as follows: "Unlike substantive evidence which is offered for the purpose of 
persuading the trier of fact as to the truth of a proposition on which the determination of the 
tribunal is to be asked, impeachment is that which is designed to discredit a witness, i.e. to 
reduce the effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth the evidence which explains why the 
jury should not put faith in him or his testimony." State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 
727, 748 (2011) quoting State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862, 868-69, 119 P.3d 637, 643-44 (Ct. App. 
2004). Here, the State's theory of the case was that Sarah got the rifle out of Mel Speegle's 
closet, removed the scope, carried the weapon to the house and accurately fired the weapon 
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twice, all without leaving any of her o\vn fingerprints on the gun and at the same time not 
destroying the unknown fingerprints. Consequently, the evidence that Christopher Hill's fresh 
fingerprints were on the gun and ammunition, that he was the one who took off the scope shortly 
before the murders, and he was the last person to touch the weapon is undoubtedly material. See 
e.g., Ellington, supra (testimony and training materials used by state's witness in prior trial lent 
support to the conclusions of defense witness); and State v. Hayes, 144 Idaho 574, 578,165 P.3d 
288,292 (CL App. 2007) (alibi evidence was material evidence). 
The final Drapeau factor is discussed below. 
c. The Newly Discovered Evidence Would Probably Result in An Acquittal. Further, 
Counsel's Inexcusable Failure to Present Evidence Which Was Readily Available at the Time 
of Trial Prejudiced Sarah. 
1. The Newly Discovered Evidence Would Have Caused an Acquittal. 
The court identified several facts which convinced it that the evidence would not have 
resulted in an acquittal. PC R Vol. 7, p 1921-1924, (Conclusions ofLaw~~ 106 -123). When 
those facts are carefully considered, it is clear the trial court erred in its conclusion. The court's 
arguments in support of its conclusion that the fourth Drapeau standard was not met are set forth 
below, followed by the reasons the court's conclusion is in error. 
108. The jury was aware that unidentified fingerprints were on the scope, 
gun, some of the shells, and the box containing the shells. (T 
3077:1-17). Thus, it was established at trial that Johnson had left no 
fingerprints on those items; if any of the prints on those items 
belonged to the "real killer," then the killer was not Johnson and was 
some unidentified person. 
109. Pangburn utilized this fingerprint information and argued it to the 
jury, to no avaiL (See, e.g., Supplemental Appeal Transcript, 
270:11-272:25) (Pangburn's closing argument that the fingerprints on 
the rifle and scope had not been there very long - implying that the 
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"real killer" was unidentified). 
110. The jury was aware of the phantom prints, and they still convicted 
Johnson of both counts of first degree murder; thus, telling a new jury 
the name of the owner of those phantom prints will not likely produce 
an acquittal. 
PC R Vol. 7, p. 1921. 
The fact that the jury was aware that unidentified prints were on the scope, gun, some of 
the shells, and the box containing the shells does not affect the new trial analysis because 
unidentified prints are profoundly different from identified prints. 
One of the big questions in this case was obviously "If not Sarah, then who?" In fact, the 
State argued this question in closing to the jury in an arguably improper shifting of the burden of 
proof to the defense. 
Now what kind of defense did the defense put up? It's called a SODDI defense. 
S-O-D-D-I. And you know, that's a defense that's well-worn, that the defense 
resorts to when the facts are against them and the law is against them. 
Now, what is it? It's Some Other Dude Did It. Well, who are they blaming this 
on? Who are they blaming this on? We still don't know. 
T Supp. Tr. p. 177, In. 3-10. 
Later the State argued: 
Okay, so if you want to think Sarah's not involved, then you got to presume 
somebody slipped in while she was asleep ... 
T Supp. Tr. p. 203, In. 17-19. 
In rebuttal the State again hit on this theme: 
The defense has tried to convince you that there is a reasonable doubt in this case 
due to the possibility of an unknown shooter. 
Ladies and gentlemen, when you look at the evidence in this case and you weigh it 
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against the theory of this unknown shooter, it becomes clear that it is not a 
reasonable interpretation of the evidence. It is unreasonable to believe that 
anyone other than Sarah Johnson could have committed this horrible, horrible act. 
T Supp. Tr. p. 315, In. 24-p. 316, In. 8. 
In making this argument, the State emphasized that the unknown prints did not come 
from anyone associated with the household. This emphasis makes sense because if the prints had 
come from someone who knew the house, there was less reason to believe that Sarah was 
involved. 
Now, in order to try and convince you that there is reasonable doubt in this case, 
the defense has pointed to an unknown shooter. So I'm going to ask you to look 
at the facts of this case as a whole, and the big picture, to determine whether this 
unknown shooter theory is reasonable. 
If you believe that an unknown shooter committed this crime, you first have to 
believe that this person somehow had a motive. The evidence in this case has 
shown that Alan and Diane Johnson were good people. They didn't have any 
enemIes. 
If you believe that an unknown shooter committed this crime, you have to believe 
that somehow they had access to and knowledge of all the items used in this 
cnme. 
All these items came from inside the house. From inside the guesthouse which, as 
the testimony indicated, was normally locked. Inside that guest bedroom closet, 
where just one week before that Bryan Higgason said, 'I stayed there for four 
nights, I never saw any guns. They were hidden.' 
Access to and knowledge of all the items inside the house, including the gloves, 
the robe, the knives. Somehow able to get into this house and gather up all these 
things to use in this crime; yet not wake up Alan, Diane or Sarah, and alert them 
to their presence. 
Now, if you believe that in fact an unknown shooter could have done that, again, 
you'd have to believe that they committed this crime in such a way that they 
didn't bring anything with them. 
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These really bad gang bangers, they're going to come to this house and commit a 
gang hit. Didn't bring their own guns. We're talking about gang members here, 
and they don't have guns to use. 
They go down to the Johnson home to commit a crime and say, 'Well, maybe 
we'll find some guns when we get there.' It's just not reasonable. 
It's not reasonable to think that they would go down to commit this crime and 
decide, 'Well, we'll find some gloves and some clothing to cover us up so we 
don't leave any fingerprints or get any blood on us when we get there.' 
T Supp. Tr. p. 329, In. 21 - p. 334, In. 4. 
The argument continued in this vein until the State finally summed up: 
So that when you look at this evidence as a whole, and you look at this unknown 
shooter theory and you apply your common sense, the unknown shooter theory is 
not reasonable ... 
T Supp. Tr. p. 336, In. 21-24. 
Clearly the fact that the unknown fingerprints could not be matched to any specific person 
was key to the State's argument. But, once the prints were matched, they were linked to 
someone who knew where to find the guns and had a connection to the Johnson house. 
Christopher Hill and Mel Speegle both testified that Christopher had helped Mel move 
into the guesthouse and so he knew the Johnson guesthouse and knew where the guns were 
stored. PC EH p. 938, In. 1-3; p. 940, In. 25 - p. 941, In. 6; p. 948, In. 9 - p. 948, In. 5; p. 964, In. 
10-12. See also PC R Vol. 2, p. 549, a police report documenting that Mel Speegle stated that 
Mr. Hill helped him move the guns into the guesthouse. And, Mr. Hill did not have anyone who 
came forward to verify his claim that he was camping by himself on the Magic Reservoir on the 
day the Johnsons were killed. PC EH p. 975, In. 2-19. And, further, Janet Sylten testified at trial 
that she and Russ Nuxoll had also been living at the Reservoir - which created a possible 
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connection betwccn Mr. Hill and Ms. Sylten, who had a documented violent history, had scared 
Ms. Lehat, had already likely committed a theft from the Johnsons and made threatening or 
frightening statements to Diane Johnson. And, moreover, who knew the Johnson house 
intimately having just cleaned it. 
If the jury had known not only that there were unidentified prints on the murder weapon 
and ammunition, but also that the prints belonged to someone who knew where the gun and 
ammunition were hidden, who was familiar with the guesthouse, and who may have been 
connected with a woman who had likely committed one crime against the Johnsons and had a 
motive to commit another to stop them from making allegations that could result in revocation of 
her newly minted parole, and who knew the Johnson house well, the outcome would have been 
different. Combining this knowledge with the lack of any forensic evidence tying Sarah to the 
crimes, the jury would have acquitted Sarah. 
The fact that the jury was aware that unidentified fingerprints were on the scope, gun, 
some of the shells, and the box containing the shells doesn't matter to the new trial analysis 
because it was the identification of the person leaving the prints along with the freshness 
evidence which made it impossible for the State to carry its burden of proof against Sarah. The 
jury was not aware of any of that evidence. The evidence presented at trial was merely 
foundation for the important evidence which was not before the jury. 
Pangburn's use of the fingerprint evidence actually presented at trial during closing 
argument is irrelevant to the new trial question because the evidence is not the same. Pangburn 
did not have the evidence that it was Mr. Hill who took off the scope and who was the person 
who last touched the gun. He had evidence that fingerprints can last as long as a year before 
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evaporating, so the unknown fingerprints could have been left behind months earlier and when 
the rifle was being used for a totally innocent purpose. That evidence is not useful when the 
argument is the unknown prints are the prints of the shooter. This is established by Pangburn's 
jury argument about the age of the fingerprints which consisted of a desultory and ineffectual 
three sentences. 16 
The fact that the jury was aware of the phantom prints, but still convicted Sarah does not 
mean the newly discovered evidence would not have resulted in an acquittal because the freshness 
evidence was not presented at trial which would have made the newly discovered evidence of Mr. 
Hill's identity powerful evidence of at least reasonable doubt and indeed innocence. 
111. Speegle and Hill both testified as to how, when and where Hill had 
touched the rifle. The fact that this information is now known makes 
the fingerprint testimony even less valuable than it was at the time of 
the trial when the defense could argue that a nameless third party 
handled the gun, the shells and removed the scope. 
Speegle and Hill testified that Hill had touched the rifle although their testimony was not 
exactly consistent. Hill claimed that he had touched the rifle scope and ammunition while target 
shooting sometime in 2000 (three years before the murders). PC EH p. 965, In. 21 - p. 968, In. 21. 
Speegle did not know that Hill had used his rifle. Rather, he only knew that Hill had helped him 
move the rifle. PC EH p. 957, In. 9-15. Most importantly, Speegle could not testifY that Hill did 
not touch the rifle the morning of the shootings and touching the weapon in the past does not 
exclude Hill from having touched the rifle and removing its scope on the morning of the 
shootings. 
16 "Those fingerprints had not been there for very long. They couldn't have been. So 
there they are, you have fingerprints inside the box of bullets that match the scope, the gun that 
killed the -- the scope off the gun that killed these people." T Supp. Tr., pg 270, In. 22-25. 
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To the contrary, the State's evidence makes it more likely that Hill was the shooter 
because it shows that he was aware of the location of the weapon and ammunition and was 
familiar with how it worked due to personal experience. (This personal experience with the 
weapon made him far more likely than Sarah to be capable of committing the offenses with only 
the minimum two shots.) The additional fact that Hill's identity is now known exonerates Sarah 
because it shows she was not the one who fired the weapon that morning and shows she was not 
an accomplice as there is no evidence that she and Hill even knew each other much less had a 
reason to act in concert. 
Further, Hill's testimony that he placed the fingerprints on the weapon when he was target 
practicing in 2000 was challenged by Mr. Kerchusky's testimony that the prints would not be on 
the weapon after a year and were, in fact, deposited just before the shootings. Moreover, Hill 
testified that he had sighted the scope in 2000. But his prints were on the scope in a way less 
consistent with sighting it than with removing it. PC EH Tr. p. 848, In. 8 - p. 850, In. 20. 
112. The court recognizes that Mr. Kerchusky testified in a contradictory 
manner to this conclusion; he is convinced of his theory of the case, as 
much as the state's expert, Ms. Walthall is convinced that you cannot 
age fingerprints. 
113. This court's task is to evaluate both witnesses' testimony in light of the 
entire record before the court. In doing so, the court chooses not to 
accept Kerchusky's hypothesis. 
114. This court, as fact-finder, is not bound to accept the testimony of any 
expert witness. See Henderson v. McCain Foods, Inc., 142 Idaho 559, 
566, 130 P.3d 1097,1104 (2006) (the factfinder is free to determine the 
weight to be given to the testimony of an expert); In re Baby Boy Doe, 
127 Idaho 452, 460, 902 P.2d 477, 485 (1995) (the weight to be given to 
expert testimony is for the trier of fact). 
The court is answering the wrong question here. Its task was not to determine for itself 
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whether to accept Ms. Walthall's or Mr. Kerchusky's testimony as if it were the ultimate trier of 
fact. The judge is not the jury. The court's job was to evaluate how the jury would see the new 
evidence within the context of the trial and then determine whether or not it would have raised a 
reasonable doubt as to Sarah's guilt. That is a much different question from the one actually 
answered by the court because the jury did not have to believe Mr. Kerchusky's testimony to the 
exclusion of Ms. Walthall's in order to return not guilty verdicts. Mr. Kerchusky's testimony 
would have raised a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors even if it had not been fully 
embraced. The court, thus, abused its discretion in this regard because it failed to identity the 
correct legal standard and then act consistently therewith. See Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. 
Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993,1000 (1991) (listing when court will be found 
to have abused its discretion); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217,221 (2008) 
(same). 
115. The court simply cannot accept the theory that Hill was the unknown 
killer in this case. Hill testified credibly that he was camping on East 
Magic Road at the time of the murders. He had no access to the guest 
house or to the Johnson home; he has no knowledge of the inner 
workings of the Johnson home, i.e., where knives were hidden, where 
Sarah's robe was kept, or where the key to the gun safe was located (to 
retrieve the 9mm magazine). The totality of the circumstances simply 
does not support Kerchusky's theory that Hill was the last person to 
touch the scope, the gun, or the ammunition and this court docs not 
accept that theory. 
Again, the court answers the wrong question. It does not need to accept or believe the 
defense theory of the case. It needs to detennine whether the newly discovered evidence would 
have raised a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors. And, in answering the correct inquiry, 
Christopher Hill's denial of committing the murder cannot be considered to be determinative. In 
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fact, his in-court denial that he murdered the lohnsons is not surprising and has very little, if any, 
importance. He has an obvious motive to lie in this regard. Further, he no doubt knew the 
question was coming and his answer had been carefully prepared and rehearsed prior to his 
testimony. 
Of more interest is his statement that he was at his campsite on East Magic Reservoir 
Road "on the specific night of the murders." PC EH Tr. p. 965, In. 10-14. This fact is of interest 
because, as discussed above, it provides a link between Mr. Hill and Janet Sylten who knew the 
home and had a motive to commit the crimes. 
116. The court also does not find it surprising that Johnson's fingerprints 
were not on the weapon, the scope, or any of the ammunition or 
packaging, given that a leather glove was found in her room in the 
trash can, and the matching glove was wrapped in Johnson's robe 
ready for trash pickup, along with a latex glove containing Johnson's 
DNA. 
The court's implicit conclusion, i.e., that the newly discovered evidence is not highly 
exculpatory, does not follow from the evidence cited. The fact that Hill's fingerprints were found 
on the rifle is surprising if he was not the killer. Otherwise, someone else took the rifle out from 
under the blankets which covered it and got it out of the closet without wiping off or even 
obscuring his finger and palm prints. Then this other person, according to the State, loaded the 
weapon and removed the scope all while wearing Diane Johnson's driving gloves so not to leave 
prints, again without wiping off Mr. Hill's fingerprints. 
But a greater problem with the court's analysis is this: the gloves, unlike the rifle and the 
robe, did not have blood on them. According to the expert testimony and common sense, this 
means that they were not worn during the shooting. It is impossible to imagine a scenario wherein 
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anyone could have worn the gloves in an environment where both the gun being held and the robe 
on the anns holding the gun get blood on them but the gloves remain pristine. 
Finally, the presence of the gloves in Sarah's room and the garbage can outside is more 
consistent with an intent by the real killer to divert suspicion to Sarah than some theory that Sarah 
carefully plotted and planned the murders and then left gloves not even used in her room and the 
trash where they were quickly discovered by the police. 
117. Moreover, the trial jury was also instructed on the theory of aiding and 
abetting murder. Use of such instruction was affirmed on appeal. See 
State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912 (2008). 
118. While the state did not rely upon that "theory pf liability" in proving 
its case, see 145 Idaho at 975, 188 P.3d at 917, the jury was free to 
consider that theory because "it was Johnson who argued that she 
could not have been the actual shooter." Id. at 977,188 P.3d at 919. 
119. Nothing presented to this court during the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing establishes that Johnson, even if she were not the actual 
shooter, was not complicit as an aider and abettor. 
The court's discussion of accomplice liability in the above three paragraphs is off the 
mark. The jury, as is plain by its return of the firearm enhancement, did not find Sarah guilty 
under an aiding and abetting theory. Thus, evidence that she was not the shooter is evidence 
likely to produce an acquittal. This is especially so because there is no evidence linking Mr. Hill 
and Sarah and there is no reason for them to have been acting in concert. At the same time, there 
is a link between Mr. Hill and the fired Janet Sylten, who did have a motive to harm Diane 
Johnson. So the fact that Mr. Hill was the last person to touch the murder weapon exonerates 
Sarah under the State's principal theory and the court's accomplice liability theory. 
120. It is undisputed that Johnson was home at the time of the murders. 
There was no forced entry in this case, either to the Johnson home or 
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the guesthouse; Johnson's bedroom contained .264 caliber cartridges, a 
9mm magazine and a right-handed leather glove matching the left one 
wrapped in Johnson's robe in the garbage; both gloves belonged to 
Diane and were kept in the family vehicle; the knives found in the 
guest bedroom and at the foot of the Johnsons' bed were located where 
an intruder or stranger would have difficulty finding them; Johnson 
had a key to the guesthouse; Johnson was angry with her parents 
because they disapproved of her relationship with Santos; and Johnson 
gave numerous conflicting stories about what she allegedly was doing 
when her parents were shot. 
None of these observations take away from the exculpatory force of the newly discovered 
evidence. 
The fact that Sarah was home at the time of the murders does not mean she was involved 
in the murders. Innocent people are often present at the places where crimes are committed. 
And the fact that there was no forced entry to the Johnson's home or the guesthouse does 
not show that Sarah was guilty because the doors were unlocked - indeed, the outside door to the 
kitchen and the master bedroom were not only unlocked, they were open. Note also Sheriff 
Femling's testimony that people in Blaine County did not lock their doors at night until after the 
Johnsons were killed. T Vol. 9, pg. 6205, In. 25 - pg. 6206, In. 4. ("We're in a community that 
many of the people don't even lock their doors. And so after this, and not being able to make an 
arrest for those seven weeks, you know, really changed the look of the community.") 
The cartridges, magazine and the right-handed leather glove were left by the shooter who 
was in a rush to leave and cast suspicion on Sarah. If the murder had been the carefully planned 
crime described by the State, Sarah would have been exceedingly careful to remove those items. 
And others, including Janet Sylten could well have known of the location of the gloves and 
knives. 
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While there was testimony that Sarah's parents disapproved of her relationship with 
Santos and that Sarah was angry, it is a rare family wherein teenage daughters and their parents 
are never angry with each other over boyfriend issues. That is not proof of murder. That is proof 
of adolescence. 
Finally, Sarah did not give "conflicting stories" about what she was doing when her 
parents were killed. She said she was in her room in her bed when the first shot was fired, she 
went to her parents' room and called out, and then she fled the house. 
While details within this statement changed, the thrust of the statement did not. And, 
Sarah would be a very strange person if the details in an account of such a traumatic event did not 
change. Sarah was present during a horrific crime which claimed the lives of both her parents. 
Any normal person would have difficulty remembering details under such circumstances. 
Think of sitting at the bed of a dying loved one - at a death not welcomed, but expected and not 
violent. Could someone going through that be expected to remember whether the last moment of 
life was preceded by a cough and then a rattling breath or a rattling breath and then a cough? 
Could someone state for certain whether the window by the bed was open or closed? Could 
someone state without hesitation or error whether the flowers were on the nightstand or on the 
dresser? In facing trauma, no one remembers all the details precisely and clearly. 
It was no surprise and certainly not incriminating evidence that Sarah was unable to 
remember whether she was asleep or awake when the first shot was fired, the exact words that she 
said when she called out, and whether the bedroom doors were open or closed. 
If Sarah gave "conflicting stories" about what she was doing it was more likely to be a 
result of the shock and distress felt by a young girl who saw her family destroyed by another's 
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crime than evidence of a carefully planned and cooly executed premeditated murder. Sarah's 
story would have been totally straight, well thought out and consistent over time had the crime 
described by the State actually taken place. 
This thin circumstantial gruel was seasoned with character assassination at the trial to 
convict Sarah. 17 Had the jury heard the evidence that the prints left on the scope were left when 
the scope was removed and that Hill, who left the prints on the ammunition and gun was the last 
one to touch the rifle, it would have acquitted Sarah. Therefore, a new trial should have been 
granted. 
2. Counsel's Deficient Performance Was Prejudicial. 
The trial court failed to articulate any reasons for its conclusion that Sarah had not suffered 
any prejudice. PC R Vol. 7, p. 1917 (~ 94). That is no surprise given its erroneous conclusion 
that Pangburn's performance was constitutionally adequate. In fact, however, the omitted 
evidence, had it been inquired of at trial would have caused a different result to a reasonable 
probability. 
17 As a very small sample of what went on, in closing, the State argued: 
We know, even from her best friends and her family, that she was selfish, she was 
defiant, she was self-absorbed, and she was obsessed with money. 
She had a history of much older boyfriends according to all of her friends. 
And at best, at the very best, her friends and family could only say, "well, she does 
stretch the truth, and she exaggerates a lot." 
T Supp. Tr. p. 177, In. 20 - p. 178, In. 2. 
By the time of sentencing things had escalated to the point that Sheriff F emling blamed 
Sarah for causing the children of Blaine County to become hooked on heroin. T Supp. Tr. Vol. 
9,p.6200,ln. 19-p.6201,ln. 12. 
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It is legally irrelevant that the trial court determined that the newly discovered evidence 
would not have resulted in an acquittal because the Strickland prejudice requirement is a less 
demanding standard. Unlike in a new trial motion, a petitioner who raises a Strickland claim does 
not need to show the evidence would have resulted in an acquittal. Under Strickland's second 
prong, the petitioner must only show a reasonable probability that the outcome of trial would be 
different but for counsel's deficient performance. State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 312, 955 P.2d 
1082, 1091 (1998). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 
in the outcome." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010) quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Thus, the standard for prejudice under Strickland is a less demanding 
standard than that for a new trial under Drapeau. 
In this case, the evidence would have made a difference in the verdict. Even without the 
newly discovered evidence that Christopher Hill's fingerprints were on the rifle, scope and 
ammunition, the readily available freshness evidence would have shown that someone besides 
Sarah was the shooter. That would have defeated the State's theory of the case, i.e., that Sarah 
shot her parents because she was upset that they had forbidden her from seeing Bruno Sanchez. 
Further, since it was not Bruno's fingerprints on the weapon (and the State was careful to compare 
Bruno's known prints to the unknown prints), the freshness evidence also exonerates Sarah under 
the court's accomplice liability theory. Thus, prejudice under Strickland has also been shown. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Sarah asks this Court to reverse the judgment of the District 
Court and remand the case with directions to enter judgment in favor of Sarah, vacate the 
convictions and grant a new trial. 
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Respectfully submitted this ~ day of April, 2012. 
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